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THE AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION: WHAT IT IS AND
WHAT IT IS NOT - A-RATIONALE IN SEARCH
OF A CLEARER LABEL*
By

JUDGE CHARLES

E.

MOYLAN, JR.**

The so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement of the
fourth amendment would pose few conceptual difficulties but for the simplistic assumption on the part of many lawyers and judges that the "automobile exception" has something to do with automobiles. It is the burden
of this article to establish that that is not necessarily so. There are many
legitimate warrantless searches of automobiles that do not remotely involve the "automobile exception." Conversely, there are some legitimate
warrantless searches of non-automobiles that do. Our only real problem is
that of coming to grips with the word "automobile."
"Automobile" means one thing to teen-aged sons and to garage mechanics. It is a means of transportation. It connotes wheels and engines and flat
tires and speeding tickets. "Automobile" in the phrase "automobile
exception" means something very different to a constitutional lawyer. It
connotes a legitimate warrantless search of a constitutionally protected
area whenever (1) probable cause to believe that that area contains evidence of crime conjoins with (2) an exigency arising out of the mobility and
imminent disappearance of that very constitutionally protected area itself.
Notwithstanding the clear linguistic dichotomy between the mode of
transportation on the one hand and the constitutionally significant combination of preconditions on the other hand, there is all too frequently a
conditioned reflex that assumes the latter from the former. There is a
semantic inertia that remains fixed within a rigid mental set unless and
until the verbal symbol itself changes-a semantic inertia that refuses to
shift gears analytically with the more subtle change of connotation within
an unchanged verbal symbol.
The judicial community and the academic community alike have labored to fit every warrantless search of a movable vehicle onto a procrustean couch of analysis under the "automobile exception." It is, of course,
possible to stretch the statement of the "automobile exception" so thin as
to cover every legitimate warrantless probe into the interior of the family
Chevrolet. Such a statement would be tantamount, however, to a virtual
restatement of the entire fourth amendment. The statement would lose all
utility, for once it says everything, it says nothing.
*

This article will appear as a chapter in a forthcoming book by the author, who retains

full copyright privileges herein.
** Associate Judge, Maryland Court of Special Appeals. Johns Hopkins University (B.A.,
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Once we have unfettered ourselves from the semantic inertia, however,
we are free to appreciate that an investigative search into the interior of
an automobile or an automobile equivalent may proceed warrantlessly and
legitimately not simply upon the predicate of probable cause plus exigency
but upon half a dozen other predicates involving other combinations of
constitutionally significant phenomena. The initial passkey to the analytical unfettering is to trade in the linguistically troubling label "automobile
exception" for the original, and semantically unencumbered, label of the
"Carroll Doctrine."
The thesis of this article has now been fully stated. The rest is but
elaboration.
I.

WHAT THE CARROLL DOCTRINE IS

The eponymic case for the doctrine was, of course, Carroll v. United
States.' Carroll is today one of at least six well-recognized exceptions to
the warrant requirement. The base proposition giving life to that requirement is that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without
prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the
Fourth Amendment-subject only to a few specifically established and
well-delineated exceptions." ' 2 When Carrollwas decided on March 2, 1925,
it became the second oldest of those exceptions, deferring in seniority only
to the warrantless search incident to lawful arrest.3 Among the more junior
of the exceptions are hot pursuit,' stop and frisk,' the Plain View Doctrine,
and consent.! The common thread running through at least the four older
of the six exceptions is some variety of exigency.'
1. 267 U.S. 132, 45 S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925).
2. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032, 29 L.Ed.2d 564,
576 (1971), quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d
576, 585 (1967).
3. The fullest statement about this exception is found in Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969). For the history and development of this exception
see Moylan, The Plain View Doctrine: Unexpected Child of the Great "Search Incident"
Geography Battle, 26 MER. L. REV. 1047 (1975).
4. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).
5. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Sibron v. New York,
392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).
6. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, Part II C and D, 464-84, 91 S.Ct. 2022-37,
29 L.Ed.2d 564, 581-93 (1971). See also Moylan, supra note 3.
7. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
8. A warrantless seizure under the Plain View Doctrine does not require exigency but is
permitted simply to avoid "a needless inconvenience" to the police, because, on the other
side of the balance scales, there is no peril to either of "the two distinct constitutional
protections served by the warrant requirement" - the sanctity of the threshold itself or the
protection against "a general, exploratory rummaging." Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 467-68, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2039, 29 L.Ed.2d 576, 584 (1971). A search by virtue of a valid
consent given by the person enjoying the fourth amendment protection is not predicated upon
exigency or any other circumstance empowering a policeman to do anything. It is rather a
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A.

Carroll v. United States

During the great national experiment of Prohibition, parched and thirsty
midwesterners looked covetously across the Detroit River into more libertarian Ontario where spirits still flowed freely. It was inevitable that some
of those spirits would ultimately flow westward and southward into the
United States. In December, 1921, an Oldsmobile roadster, driven by
George Carroll and John Kiro, was driving westward from Detroit toward
Grand Rapids, when it was stopped by federal agents at a point 16 miles
east of Grand Rapids. The roadster was searched without a warrant. Behind the upholstering of the seats, the filling of which had been removed,
the agents found 68 bottles. Their labels held them out to be blended
Scotch whiskey and Gordon's gin. While chemical analysis would not
vouch for the prestigious quality of the contents, it established that the
contents were, at least, whiskey and gin of some variety.' On the basis
largely of the recovered contraband, Carroll and Kiro were convicted of
"transporting in an automobile intoxicating spirituous liquor, to wit, 68
quarts of so-called bonded whiskey and gin, in violation of the National
Prohibition Act."' 0
The question squarely before the Supreme Court was whether a warrantless search could ever be made under any circumstances in a constitutionally protected area. There was no dispute over an automobile's being a
constitutionally protected area. Writing for seven members of the Court,"
Chief Justice Taft pointed out:
that the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by
the 4th Amendment has been construed, practically since the beginning
of the government, as recognizing a necessary difference between a search
of a store, dwelling house, or other structure in respect of which a proper
official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor
boat, wagon, or automobile for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant, because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of
the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.1"
case of the fourth amendment inapplicable rather than the fourth amendment satisfied. With
respect to third-party consent, there is a lack of full expectation of privacy in the defendant
who runs the risk that the third party may invite others, even including policemen, into the
common protected area. With respect to first-party consent, there is a voluntary waiver of
the fourth amendment protection. The Supreme Court, however, prefers to list consent as
one of the exceptions to the warrant requirement rather than as an instance of the fourth
amendment inapplicable.
9. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 134-36, 45 S.Ct. 280, 281, 69 L.Ed. 543, 544-45
(1925).
10. Id. at 134, 45 S.Ct. at 281, 69 L.Ed. at 544.
11. Justice McReynolds, joined by Justice Sutherland, dissented, insisting that the propriety of the automobile search depended upon the propriety of a necessarily antecedent
arrest.
12. 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551.
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In supporting his argument, the Chief Justice looked to the legislative
history of the acts supplementing and enforcing the National Prohibition
Act. To one of the supplemental acts, the Senate added what became
known as the Stanley Amendment, which proscribed all warrantless
searches of all protected areas. The House of Representatives rejected this
amendment and restricted the prohibition to the warrantless searches of
fixed premises. Chief Justice Taft quoted from that section of the House
Judiciary Committee report, which focused upon the inappropriateness of
proscribing warrantless searches of automobiles:
[W]hat is perhaps more serious, it will make it impossible to stop the
rum-running automobiles engaged in like illegal traffic. It would take from
the officers the power that they absolutely must have to be of any service,
for if they cannot search for liquor without a warrant they might as well
be discharged. It is impossible to get a warrant to stop an automobile.
Before a warrant could be secured the automobile would be beyond the
reach of the officer with its load of illegal liquor disposed of.'3
The Chief Justice then put the official imprimatur of the Constitution
upon the distinction between vehicles and fixed premises which had been
drawn by the Congress:
The intent of Congress to make a distinction between the necessity for
a search warrant in the searching of private dwellings and in that of
automobiles and other road vehicles in the enforcement of the Prohibition
Act is thus clearly established by the legislative history of the Stanley
Amendment. Is such a distinction consistent with the 4th Amendment?
We think that it is.' 4
In contrasting warrantless searches of movable vehicles or vessels with
the more rigid requirement of a search warrant where fixed premises were
concerned, the Carrolldecision looked again to history. It pointed out that
the first session of the first Congress, which proposed the fourth
amendment, also passed the Act of 1789. The 24th section thereof provided
that certain collectors and other officials
shall have full power and authority, to enter any ship or vessel, in which
they shall have reason to suspect any goods, wares or merchandise subject
to duty shall be concealed; and therein to search for, seize, and secure any
such goods, wares or merchandise ....,
That same section provided, however, that if the "cause to suspect a concealment" was focused upon "any particular dwelling house, store, building, or other place,"'" the permitted investigation would be that the offi13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

146, 45
147, 45
150, 45
150-51,

S.Ct. at
S.Ct. at
S.Ct. at
45 S.Ct.

283, 69
283, 69
284, 69
at 284,

L.Ed. at 548.
L.Ed. at 549.
L.Ed. at 550.
69 L.Ed. at 550.
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cials should "upon application on oath or affirmation to any justice of the
peace, be entitled to a warrant to enter such house, store, or other place
(in the daytime only) and there to search for such goods."" Subsequent
enactments dealing with the same subject matter contained similar provisions. The Carroll decision emphasized this historic distinction:
Thus contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we
find in the first Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between
goods subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar
place, and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable vessel where they readily could be put out of reach of a search warrant."
Historical reference was also made to the Act of May 6, 1822," and its
successor provisions, which empowered "any Indian agent, subagent, or
commander of a military post in the Indian country" 0 to search any
"boats, stores, packages, wagons, sleds, and places of deposit"', whenever
the officials had "reason to suspect" that the subject was introducing
"any spirituous liquor or wine into the Indian country. 23 Warrantless
searches and seizures under these conditions were recognized as justifiable
by the Supreme Court in American Fur Co. v. United States.2 4' The statute
took on a distinctly more modem flavor when the Indian Appropriation Act
of March 2, 1917, ' expanded the category of boats, wagons and sleds and
provided that "automobiles used in introducing or attempting to introduce
intoxicants into the Indian territory may be seized, libeled, and forfeited.
After the "somewhat extended reference to these statutes"u to supply
the authority of history to the fourth amendment distinction between fixed
premises and movable vehicles, the Court turned to the necessary conditions for a warrantless search of the latter. "Having thus established that
contraband goods concealed and illegally transported in an automobile or
other vehicle may be searched for without a warrant, we come now to
consider under what circumstances such search may be made." 8
The first of the two necessary conditions, and the one on which the
',2

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 151, 45 S.Ct. at 284, 69 L.Ed. at 550.
Id.
3 Stat. 682 (1822), later codified as §2140 of the Revised Statutes.
267 U.S. at 152, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551.
Id.
Id.
Id.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 358, 7 L.Ed. 450 (1829).
Ch. 146, 39 Stat. 969, 970 (1917).
267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551.
Id.

Id.
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Carrollopinion lavished the most attention, was that of probable cause to
believe that the vehicle or vehicle equivalent indeed contained evidence of
crime. The Supreme Court pointed out that it would be "intolerable and
unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully
using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search."
The opinion pointed out that such routine inspections are permissible
when one is crossing an international boundary but that
those lawfully within the country, entitled to use the public highways,
have a right to free passage without interruption or search unless there is
known to a competent official authorized to search, probable cause for
believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal merchandise.30
The Court clearly drew "the line of distinction between legal and illegal
3
seizures of liquor in transport in vehicles": 1
The measure of legality of such a seizure is, therefore, that the seizing
officer shall have reasonable or probable cause for believing that the automobile which he stops and seizes has contraband liquor therein which is
2
being illegally transported.
Carrollemphasized that this was "certainly a reasonable distinction."3 It
pointed out that if probable cause were lacking, the owner of the automobile was entitled to have the automobile restored to him, was entitled to
have all evidence seized therefrom suppressed and was entitled to sue the
officer for damages. Conversely, if probable cause were present, the investigative officials "are given the opportunity which they should have, to make
the investigation necessary to trace reasonably suspected contraband
goods and to seize them." 4
In its constitutional fact-finding capacity, the Supreme Court went on
to hold that probable cause did exist for the warrantless search of the
29. Id. at 153-54, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551.
30. Id. at 154, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 552.
31. Id. at 156, 45 S.Ct. at 286, 69 L.Ed. at 552.
32. Id. at 155-56, 45 S.Ct. at 286, 69 L.Ed. at 552. The Carroll opinion both collected and
articulated definitions of probable cause. It quoted from Stacey v. Emery, 97 U.S. 642, 645,
24 L.Ed. 1035, 1036 (1878), which held that probable cause has been established "[i]f the
facts and circumstances before the officer are such as to warrant a man of prudence and
caution in believing that the offense has been committed ..
" Carrollwent on to lay down
the definition that officers had probable cause to search whenever "the facts and circumstances within their knowledge, and of which they had reasonably trustworthy information, were
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that intoxicating
liquor was being transported in the automobile which they stopped and searched." 267 U.S.
at 162, 45 S.Ct. at 288, 69 L.Ed. at 555.
33. Id. at 156, 45 S.Ct. at 286, 69 L.Ed. at 552.
34. Id.
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Oldsmobile roadster in which Carroll and Kiro were driving. It pointed out
that as early as September 29, seve ral federal agents had had contact with
both defendants in an apartment in Grand Rapids, whereat it was agreed
that Carroll and Kiro would deliver three cases of bootleg whiskey to the
undercover agents. A price was agreed upon and the agents got a good look
at the car in which the two bootleggers were driving. Apparently suspicious
as to the status of their would-be customers, the ultimate defendants never
consummated the sale. On a subsequent date, October 6, the agents observed both Carroll and Kiro driving eastward from Grand Rapids toward
Detroit in the same Oldsmobile roadster. They attempted to trail the
vehicle but lost it in the vicinity of Lansing. Taking judicial notice of the
heavy bootlegging traffic between Detroit and Grand Rapids, the Supreme
Court concluded that the agents had probable cause to believe that the
Oldsmobile roadster contained bootleg whiskey when they spotted that
automobile, driven by the two defendants, moving westward from Detroit
toward Grand Rapids on December 15.5
The second necessary condition for a warrantless search of a vehicle
under the CarrollDoctrine is exigency. This requirement, spelled out more
fully in later cases, was more implicit than explicit in the Carroll decision
itself. The facts of Carroll do establish such exigency. The federal agents
maintained a routine patrol looking for bootleggers along the DetroitGrand Rapids axis. When they spotted the Oldsmobile roadster driven by
Carroll and Kiro on December 15, they had had no prior knowledge that
the roadster would be coming along the highway that day. Indeed, they
had not seen the car since October 6.1 The automobile was observed fortuitously as it was moving along a highway. There was clearly no opportunity
to obtain a warrant. In discussing the subject of probable cause, the Court
alluded to the absolute necessity of obtaining a warrant when it is reasonably practical to do so:
In cases where the securing of a warrant is reasonably practicable, it must
be used, and, when properly supported by affidavit, and issued after judicial approval, protects the seizing officer against a suit for damages. In
cases where seizure is impossible except without warrant, the seizing officer acts unlawfully and at his peril unless he can show the court probable
cause."
It is not the purpose of this article to examine what combinations of facts
and circumstances do or do not establish the two elements of probable
cause and exigency. It is rather to establish that whenever those two criteria are satisfied, the warrantless search of a vehicle may proceed under
the Carroll Doctrine. Whenever a warrantless search of a vehicle is predi35.
36.
37.

Id. at 160-61, 45 S.Ct. at 288, 69 L.Ed. at 554.
Id. at 160, 45 S.Ct. at 287-88, 69 L.Ed. at 554.
Id. at 156, 45 S.Ct. at 286, 69 L.Ed. at 552-53.
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cated upon the satisfaction of other criteria, the warrantless search may
be constitutional under some other doctrine, but it is most emphatically
not a Carroll Doctrine case.
In the Carroll opinion itself, the distinction was clearly drawn between
the search of an automobile qua search of an automobile, on the one hand,
and the search of an automobile as an incident of the arrest of a driver or
passenger, on the other hand. Both the defense argument and the dissenting opinion sought to confine the warrantless automobile search to something dependent upon the constitutionality of an underlying arrest. The
Carroll majority clearly rejected that position and established that the
warrantless search of an automobile, based upon probable cause plus exigency, stands upon its own feet doctrinally and is totally independent of
"search incident" criteria:
When a man is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found upon his
person or in his control which it is unlawful for him to have, and which
may be used to prove the offense, may be seized and held as evidence in
the prosecution . . . .The argument of defendants is based on the theory
that the seizure in this case can only be thus justified. If their theory were
sound, their conclusion would be. The validity of the seizure then would
turn wholly on the validity of the arrest without a seizure. But the theory
is unsound. The right to search and the validity of the seizure are not
dependent on the right to arrest. They are dependent on the reasonable
cause the seizing officer has for belief that the contents of the automobile
offend against the law. The seizure in such a proceeding comes before the
arrest . . . . [I]t is evident that if the person arrested is ignorant of the
contents of the vehicle, or if he escapes, proceedings can be had against
the liquor for destruction or other disposition . . . .The character of the
offense for which, after the contraband liquor is found and seized, the
driver can be prosecuted, does not affect the validity of the seizure.3
Carroll blazed the trail. What has followed in its wake? Although it is
the burden of this piece that there are a substantial number of warrantless
searches of automobiles that do not remotely involve the Carroll Doctrine,
it is nonetheless indisputably true that there are also a substantial number
that do. The first of these-with the automobile equivalent in the case
being a motorboat-was the case of United States v. Lee. 9
B.

United States v. Lee

In a frustratingly brief opinion, Justice Brandeis wrote for a unanimous
court in 1927 in affirming the conviction of James Lee for conspiring to
violate the revenue laws and for violating the National Prohibition Act.
The conclusion that warrantless investigative activity of some sort by the
38.
39.

Id. at 158-59, 45 S.Ct. at 287, 69 L.Ed. at 553-54. (citations omitted).
274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927).
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boatswain of a Coast Guard patrol boat was constitutional is clear, but the
doctrinal underpinnings of that conclusion are not clearly differentiated.
On the afternoon of February 16, 1925, the boatswain in the case saw Lee's
motorboat proceed in a southeasterly direction from Gloucester Harbor.
"He followed her at a distance of 500 yards; lost sight of her after sundown,
apparently in a fog, at a point about 20 miles east of Boston Light; and
discovered her later alongside the schooner L'Homme in a region commonly spoken of as Rum Row, at a point 24 miles from land. ' 4 The boatswain turned a searchlight upon the motorboat and there observed Lee
with two associates. He ordered all three men to put up their hands and
then he boarded the suspect vessel. He observed on the boat 71 cases of
grain alcohol. The liquor was not physically offered in evidence. The testimony of the boatswain, along with that of the deputy surveyor of the Port
of Boston, constituted the State's case.
Justice Brandeis appears to have rested his decision that the fourth
amendment was not violated upon three distinct and independent rationales, any one of which would have sufficed to sustain the legitimacy of the
conviction. The first of these rationales is that the fourth amendment did
not protect those things clearly observable on the deck of the motorboat
from the surveying gaze of the Coast Guard officer as he stood upon his
own boat and simply turned a searchlight upon the motorboat:
But no search on the high seas is shown. The testimony of the boatswain
shows that he used a searchlight. It is not shown that there was any
exploration below decks or under hatches. For aught that appears, the
cases of liquor were on deck and, like the defendants, were discovered
before the motorboat was boarded. Such use of a searchlight is comparable
to the use of a marine glass or a field glass. It is not prohibited by the
Constitution. Compare Hester v. United States. . .A later trespass by the
officers, if any, did not render inadmissible in evidence knowledge legally
obtained."
Justice Brandeis went further and indicated that even if a search had
taken place, that search would have been constitutional as an incident of
the arrest of Lee and his companions. Those things observed by the boatswain from the deck of his own vessel gave him probable cause for the
warrantless arrest of the three men aboard the motorboat. The further
search of the motorboat, if one were assumed to have been made, would
have followed as a legitimate incident thereto:
Moreover, search, if any, of the motor boat at sea did not violate the
Constitution, for it was made by the boatswain as an incident of a lawful
arrest. Agnello v. United States . ..11
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 560, 47 S.Ct. at 747, 71 L.Ed. at 1203.
Id. at 563, 47 S.Ct. at 748, 71 L.Ed. at 1204. (citation omitted).
Id. (citation omitted).
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Finally, Justice Brandeis seems to hold that even if a search had occurred and even if an arrest had not, the same probable cause that would
have legitimated an arrest would quite independently have legitimated a
warrantless search of the vessel qua search of the vessel under the infant
Carroll Doctrine:
In the case at bar, there was probable cause to believe that our revenue
laws were being violated by an American vessel and the persons thereon,
in such manner as to render the vessel subject to forfeiture. Under such
circumstances, search and seizure of the vessel, and arrest of the persons
thereon, by the Coast Guard on the high seas, are lawful, as like search
and seizure of an automobile, and arrest of the persons therein, by prohibition officers on land, are lawful. Compare Carroll v. United States.. .
In terms of the growth of the doctrine, it is clear, in the wake of Lee,
that automobile equivalents have evolved from land creatures into marine
species as well.
C.

Gambino v. United States

In Gambino v. United States,4 the main emphasis of the opinion was
on the question whether state troopers were operating in cooperation with
federal officials when they perpetrated what would have been a fourth
amendment violation if done by federal agents themselves. The Court, in
passing, did acknowledge the Carroll Doctrine. Without supplying any
analysis, Justice Brandeis held for the Court that the New York state
troopers in the case did not have probable cause:
The government contends that the evidence was admissible, because
there was probable cause, Carroll v. United States. . . . The defendants
contend that there was not probable cause . . . . We are of opinion on the
facts, which it is unnecessary to detail, that there was not probable
cause."
The only difficulty with the opinion is that it later referred collectively to
"arrest, search and seizure" and did not expressly distinguish between
probable cause for the arrest and probable cause for the warrantless search
of the automobile.
D.

Husty v. United States

In 1931 Husty v. United States" applied the CarrollDoctrine but did not
alter its dimensions in any way. Richard Husty and Charles Laurel both
43.

Id. (citation omitted).

44.

275 U.S. 310, 48 S.Ct. 137, 72 L.Ed. 293 (1927).

45.

Id. at 313, 48 S.Ct. at 137, 72 L.Ed. at 295 (citation omitted).

46.

282 U.S. 694, 51 S.Ct. 240, 75 L.Ed. 629 (1931).
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were convicted in the District Court for western Michigan of both transporting and possessing intoxicating liquors in violation of the National
Prohibition Act. At issue was the constitutionality of a warrantless search
of their automobile which produced 18 cases of contraband whiskey. The
evidence at the suppression hearing established both elements for a legitimate warrantless search under the Carroll Doctrine.
On the issue of probable cause, it was brought out that one of the arresting officers had known Husty as a "bootlegger" for a number of years and
had arrested him in both 1922 and 1928 for violations of the National
Prohibition Act. Both arrests had resulted in convictions. On the day of
the arrest and search, a fully reliable informant passed the word that
"Husty had two loads of liquor in automobiles of a particular make and
description, parked in particular places on named streets."" The officer
"found one of the cars described, at the point indicated, and unattended."4 The officer maintained a surveillance until Husty, Laurel and
a third man arrived and entered the car. When Husty started the engine,
the officers moved in. Laurel and the third man fled. As to probable cause,
the Court held:
Here the information, reasonably believed by the officer to be reliable,
that Husty, known to him to have been engaged in the illegal traffic,
possessed liquor in an automobile of particular description and location;
the subsequent discovery of the automobile at the point indicated, in the
control of Husty; and the prompt attempt of his two companions to escape
when hailed by the officers, were reasonable grounds for his belief that
liquor illegally possessed would be found in the car."
The Court also touched upon the distinct element of exigency, holding
that it had not been dissipated in this case simply because the officers
might have had time to get a warrant:
The search was not unreasonable because, as petitioners argue, sufficient
time elapsed between the receipt by the officer of the information and the
search of the car to have enabled him to procure a search warrant. He
could not know when Husty would come to the car or how soon it would
be removed. In such circumstances we do not think the officers should be
required to speculate upon the chances of successfully carrying out the
search, after the delay and withdrawal from the scene of one or more
officers which would have been necessary to procure a warrant. The search
was, therefore, on probable cause, and not unreasonable; and the motion
to suppress the evidence was rightly denied. Carroll v. United
States. ....
50
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 700, 51 S.Ct. at 241, 75 L.Ed. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 701, 51 S.Ct. at 242, 75 L.Ed. at 632.
Id., 51 S.Ct. at 242, 75 L.Ed. at 632-33 (citation omitted).
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The Court also reaffirmed that a CarrollDoctrine warrantless search is
not dependent on an underlying arrest but stands upon its own distinct
predicate. "The 4th Amendment does not prohibit the search, without
warrant, of an automobile, for liquor illegally transported or possessed, if
the search is upon probable cause; and arrest for the transportation or
'"5
possession need not precede the search. Carroll v. United States ....
E.

Scher v. United States

Scher v. United States" in 1938 applied the Carroll Doctrine in a very
routine manner, contributing nothing to the doctrine itself by its meager
analysis. Officers had received information from a confidential informant
that "about midnight, December 30, 1935, a Dodge automobile with specified license plate would transport 'phony' whiskey from a specified dwelling in Cleveland, Ohio."53 The officers observed the described car at the
described house at 9:30 p.m., saw it leave that location at 10:30 p.m., saw
it return at about midnight and remain for half an hour. During that half
hour, the officers heard sounds as if the car were being loaded. They saw
it drive away at about 12:30 a.m., "apparently heavily loaded. 514 Scher
drove the car to his own residence. As h was pulling the automobile into
a rear garage, the officers moved in. They immediately accused him of
hauling bootleg whiskey; he replied that it was "just a little for a party."
When asked whether the tax on the whiskey had been paid, Scher replied
"that it was Canadian whiskey." 55 The issue of probable cause was given
short shrift:
Considering the doctrine of Carroll v. United States . . . and the application of this to the facts there disclosed, it seems plain enough that just
before he entered the garage the following officers properly could have
stopped petitioner's car, made search and put him under arrest. So much
was not seriously controverted at the argument. 8
The Court then held that the "[plassage of the car into the open garage
closely followed by the observing officer did not destroy this right. No
search was made of the garage." 57
The Court's further observation that the "[e]xamination of the automobile accompanied an arrest, without objection and upon admission of
5
probable guilt" appears to have been completely gratuitous. 1
51.

Id. at 700, 51 S.Ct. at 241, 75 L.Ed. at 632 (citation omitted).

52.

305 U.S. 251, 59 S.Ct. 174, 83 L.Ed. 151 (1938).

53. Id. at 253, 59 S.Ct. at 175, 83 L.Ed. at 153.
54. Id., 59 S.Ct. at 175, 83 L.Ed. at 154.
55. Id., 59 S.Ct. at 176, 83 L.Ed. at 154.
56. Id. at 254-55, 59 S.Ct. at 176, 83 L.Ed. at 154 (citation omitted).
57. Id. at 255, 59 S.Ct. at 176, 83 L.Ed. at 154.
58. Id. What difference would it have made if Scher had not been arrested? If none, why
muddy the waters of stare decisis with an irrelevant factor? One can readily picture dozens
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Brinegar v. United States

Factually, Brinegar v. United States 9 is the "little federal" analogue of
Carroll. Even after the great national experiment of Prohibition had
ended, parched and thirsty residents of Oklahoma-still "dry" by its own
choice-looked covetously across the Ozarks into more libertarian Missouri
where spirits once again flowed freely. It was inevitable that some of those
spirits would ultimately flow westward and southward into Oklahoma.
At about 6 p.m. on the evening of March 3, 1947, two agents of the
Alcohol Tax Unit were parked beside a highway near the Quapaw Bridge
in northeastern Oklahoma. The bridge was about five miles west of the
Missouri-Oklahoma line. They saw Brinegar drive by, headed west in his
Ford coupe. One of the agents had arrested Brinegar five months earlier
for illegally transporting liquor. He had, in addition, observed Brinegar
loading liquor into a car or truck in Joplin, Missouri, on at least two
occasions during the preceding six months. He also knew Brinegar's reputation as one who hauled liquor illegally across the line. As Brinegar's car
passed them, it appeared to be "heavily loaded" and "weighted with something."6 0 Brinegar increased his speed as he passed the officers. They
chased him for approximately a mile at top speed, gaining on him as he
skidded around a curve, sounded their siren and ultimately forced his car
to the side of the road. A search of Brinegar's car revealed 13 cases of
whiskey under and behind the front seat. Brinegar was convicted of "importing intoxicating liquor into Oklahoma."61
The element of exigency was not in dispute in Brinegar, and the Supreme Court did not touch upon it. The question before the Court was the
existence of probable cause to believe that Brinegar's automobile contained contraband whiskey. The majority opinion of Justice Rutledge held
that the case was virtually indistinguishable from Carroll and that, therefore, probable cause did exist. The Court analyzed the Carroll decision at
some length.2 The Court then went to even greater lengths in analogizing
the case before it to the Carroll case.6" Upon the facts as above outlined,"
a five-man majority of the Court concluded:
of appellants attempting to distinguish their own warrantless automobile search cases just
because those warrantless searches, otherwise in full accord with the Carroll Doctrine, had
not been accompanied by an arrest or were not attended by an "admission of probable guilt."
59. 338 U.S. 160, 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879 (1949).
60. Id. at 163, 69 S.Ct. at 1304, 93 L.Ed. at 1884.
61. Id. at 161, 69 S.Ct. at 1301, 93 L.Ed. at 1883.
62. Id. at 164-65, 69 S.Ct. at 1305, 93 L.Ed. at 1884-85.
63. Id. at 165-71, 69 S.Ct. at 1306-08, 93 L.Ed. at 1885-88.
64. The majority of the Supreme Court relied upon these facts alone as sufficient to
establish probable cause. The trial court and the U.S. Court of Appeals, on the other hand,
had held that these facts did not establish probable cause. They looked rather to certain
damaging admissions made by Brinegar immediately after his car was forced to the side of
the road as establishing probable cause just prior to the search of his automobile. Believing
that probable cause had been established prior to these admissions, however, the Supreme
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The evidence here is undisputed, is admissible on the issue of probable
cause, and clearly establishes that the agent had good ground for believing
that Brinegar was engaged regularly throughout the period in illicit liquor
running and dealing.
• . .Each of the ultimate facts found in Carrollto constitute probable
cause, when taken together, is present in this case and is fully substantiated by the proof. Accordingly the Carroll decision must be taken to
control this situation, unless it is now to be overruled."
Brinegar was a straightforward and unremarkable application of the
Carroll Doctrine. The dissenting opinion of Justice Jackson, joined by
Justices Frankfurter and Murphy, simply disputed the establishment of
probable cause under the Carroll guidelines. Under the circumstances, the
statement of Justice Rutledge at the outset of the opinion that "[t]he
crucial question is whether there was probable cause for Brinegar's arrest,
in the light of prior adjudications on this problem, more particularly
Carroll v. United States . . .which on its face most closely approximates
the situation presented here""8 appears to have been an analytical lapse.
As Carrollitself (and Husty) had made clear, an underlying arrest is not a
necessary condition for a warrantless automobile search under Carroll.
In terms of an evolving doctrine, the net effect of Lee, Gambino, Husty,
Scher and Brinegar upon the archetype case of Carroll itself had been
absolutely zero. Carrollhad been applied but not significantly fleshed out.
Indeed, as an exception to the warrant requirement, the Carroll Doctrine
was over most of its early decades very much a neglected backwater. The
reason is not hard to find. In the ordinary run of criminal investigations,
the same probable cause that points to a particular automobile as a likely
container of evidence also points to the criminality of its owner, driver or
passenger. Far more frequently than not, warrantless searches of automobiles involve an analytical overlap between the "search incident" exception and the Carroll Doctrine exception. During much of the early life of
the CarrollDoctrine, our fourth amendment law was in one or another of
the broad-scope phases of "search incident" law. 7 Since a lawful arrest
gave rise automatically, during those phases, to an incidental search of an
entire premises, it followed that when the underlying arrest occurred in or
near a vehicle, it gave rise automatically to a search of the entire vehicle.
Since cases could almost always be disposed of under the more fully articulated "search incident" law, there was little resort to the less fully develCourt did not find it necessary to review the legitimacy of those admissions as such. A
concurring opinion by Justice Burton considered the admissions to be legitimate and found
probable cause from the aggregate of all of the circumstances including the admissions.
65. 338 U.S. at 170-71, 69 S.Ct. at 1308, 93 L.Ed. at 1888.
66. Id. at 164, 69 S.Ct. at 1305, 93 L.Ed. at 1884 (citation omitted).
67. For the ebb and flow between a broad search perimeter and a narrow search perimeter
during the 42-year "great geography battle" of search incident law, see Moylan, supra note
3.
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oped CarrollDoctrine. Only with the pulling back of the search incident
perimeter in Chimel v. California"s to a point where it did not necessarily
extend to all parts of a vehicle-where some or all of the vehicle was
beyond the reach, lunge or grasp of the arrestee at the moment of the
search-did it become necessary to look more carefully at the CarrollDoctrine as providing an independent rationale for a warrantless automobile
search. Chimel was decided in 1969. The fuller development of the Carroll
Doctrine followed within the year with the case of Chambers v. Maroney.69
G.

Chambers v. Maroney

In Chambers, Justice White wrote for a seven-man majority70 of the
Court in that section of the opinion dealing with the warrantless search of
the defendant's automobile. In terms of doctrinal significance, Chambers
may be cited for three propositions.
Whereas earlier cases had simply articulated the thought that a Carroll
Doctrine search was independent of any "search incident" rationale, that
distinction was critical to the holding in Chambers. Chambersheld flat out
that the warrantless search of the automobile in that case could not be
justified as an incident of the arrest of Chambers himself or of any of his
fellow passengers:
[Tihe search that produced the incriminating evidence was made at the
police station some time after the arrest and cannot be justified as a search
incident to an arrest: "Once an accused is under arrest and in custody,
then a search made at another place, without a warrant, is simply not
incident to the arrest." Preston v.United States . ..Dyke v. Taylor
Implement Mfg. Co . .. is to the same effect; the reasons that have been
thought sufficient to justify warrantless searches carried out in connection
with an arrest no 71longer obtain when the accused is safely in custody at
the station house.
Notwithstanding the inability to rest the warrantless automobile search
upon a "search incident" predicate, the Supreme Court went on to point
out that "[t]here are, however, alternative grounds arguably justifying
the search of the car in this case." 72 Exploring the alternative ground of a
warrantless Carroll Doctrine search, the Court looked to the two elements
of probable cause and exigency.
68. 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
69. 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).
70. Only Justice Harlan dissented from this part of the opinion. Justice Blackmun took
no part in the consideration of the case.
71. 399 U.S. at 47, 90 S.Ct. at 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d at 426 (citations omitted).
72. Id. The Chambers majority also characterized Carroll as having clearly delineated
between justifying theories: "The Court also noted that the search of an auto on probable
cause proceeds on a theory wholly different from that justifying the search incident to an
arrest .. " Id. at 49, 90 S.Ct. at 1980, 26 L.Ed.2d at 427.
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Probable cause presented no difficulty. On the evening of May 20, 1963,
two men held up a Gulf service station in North Braddock, Pennsylvania.
The robbers took currency from a cash register and demanded that the
attendant turn over to them a gloveful of coins. "Two teen-agers, who had
earlier noticed a blue compact station wagon circling the block in the
vicinity of the Gulf station, then saw the station wagon speed away from
a parking lot close to the Gulf station." 3 When the police arrived, they
learned from the teen-agers that four men were in the station wagon and
that one of them was wearing a green sweater. The service station attendant confirmed that one of the robbers was wearing a green sweater and that
the other was wearing a trench coat.74 An immediate description of the car
and of the dress of two of the robbers went out over the police radio. Within
the hour and about two miles away, Chambers' light blue compact station
wagon, occupied by himself and three other men, was stopped by the
police. Chambers was wearing a green sweater and there was a trench coat
in the car. The Supreme Court, agreeing with the lower courts' rulings in
the case, concluded that "[hiaving talked to the teen-age observers and
to the victim Kovacich, the police had ample cause to stop a light blue
compact station wagon carrying four men and to arrest the occupants, one
of whom was wearing a green sweater and one of whom had a trench coat
with him in the car. 7 5 The Court then went on to hold that the probable
cause which justified the warrantless arrest of the four men also served to
justify, quite independently, the warrantless search of the automobile:
[T]he police had probable cause to believe that the robbers, carrying
guns and the fruits of the crime, had fled the scene in a light blue compact
station wagon which would be carrying four men, one wearing a green
sweater and another wearing a trench coat. As the state courts correctly
held, there was probable cause to arrest the occupants of the station
wagon that the officers stopped; just as obviously was there probable
cause to search the car for guns and stolen money."
It is with respect to the second element of exigency that the Chambers
opinion breaks new ground. In Chambers, unlike the predecessor cases
under the Carroll Doctrine, the automobile was removed to the station
house before the warrantless search was executed. In answering the defense
contention that the car could be seized, immobilized or guarded until a
warrant for its search could be obtained, the Supreme Court announced;
as an axiom, that there is no constitutional qualitative difference between
a search and a seizure. A equals B. If, therefore, a warrantless seizure is
permitted, a warrantless search is also permitted by definition. Conversely, if a warrantless search is not permitted, neither would be the
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id. at 44, 90 S.Ct. at 1977, 26 L.Ed.2d at 424.
Id.
Id. at 46-47, 90 S.Ct. at 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d at 425-426.
Id. at 47-48, 90 S.Ct. at 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d at 426.
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warrantless seizure. Granted the major premise," the conclusion does at
least follow validly. The Court's reasoning in this regard was as follows:
Arguably, because of the preference for a magistrate's judgment, only
the immobilization of the car should be permitted until a search warrant
is obtained; arguably, only the "lesser" intrusion is permissible until the
magistrate authorizes the "greater." But which is the "greater" and which
the "lesser" intrusion is itself a debatable question and the answer may
depend on a variety of circumstances. For constitutional purposes, we see
no difference between on the one hand seizing and holding a car before
presenting the probable cause issue to a magistrate and on the other hand
carrying out an immediate search without a warrant. Given probable
cause to search, either course is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
On the facts before us, the blue station wagon could have been searched
on the spot when it was stopped since there was probable cause to search
and it was a' fleeting target for a search. The probable-cause factor still
obtained at the station house and so did the mobility of the car unless the
Fourth Amendment permits a warrantless seizure of the car and the denial
of its use to anyone until a warrant is secured. In that event there is little
to choose in terms of practical consequences between an immediate search
77. Justice Harlan's dissent questions, with penetrating analysis, the truth of this major
premise. He argues initially that in the vast majority of the crime-oriented cases, the
search-with its great potentiality for putting its victim behind bars- is definitely a greater
intrusion than a mere seizure of the automobile, which in and of itself only works an inconvenience upon its owner:
However, in the circumstances in which this problem is likely to occur, the lesser
intrusion will almost always be the simple seizure of the car for the period-perhaps
a day-necessary to enable the officers to obtain a search warrant. In the first place,
as this case shows, the very facts establishing probable cause to search will often
also justify arrest of the occupants of the vehicle. Since the occupants themselves
are to be taken into custody, they will suffer minimal further inconvenience from
the temporary immobilization of their vehicle. Even where no arrests are made,
persons who wish to avoid a search-either to protect their privacy or to conceal
incriminating evidence-will almost certainly prefer a brief loss of the use of the
vehicle in exchange for the opportunity to have a magistrate pass upon the justification for the search.
Id. at 63-64, 90 S.Ct. at 1987, 26 L.Ed.2d at 435, (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
Justice Harlan goes on to point out that in those rare cases where the seizure might represent
the greater intrusion, the device of consent is always available to obviate the inconvenience:
To be sure, one can conceive of instances in which the occupant, having nothing to
hide and lacking concern for the privacy of the automobile, would be more deeply
offended by a temporary immobilization of his vehicle than by a prompt search of
it. However, such a person always remains free to consent to an immediate search,
thus avoiding any delay. Where consent is not forthcoming, the occupants of the
car have an interest in privacy that is protected by the Fourth Amendment even
where the circumstances justify a temporary seizure.
Id. at 64, 90 S.Ct. at 1987-1988, 26 L.Ed.2d at 435-436, (Harlan, J., concurring and
dissenting).
According to Justice Harlan, A most definitely does not equal B. If the premise is not sound,
the conclusion falls with it.
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without a warrant and the car's immobilization until a warrant is obtained."
Despite the overbreadth with which Chambers was initially read by
police and prosecutors, it did not do away with the requirement of exigency. It still required the initial exigency to have been present which,
along with probable cause, would have justified a warrantless automobile
search at curbside. It went to pains, however, to point out that sometimes
such a curbside search is neither convenient nor safe:
It was not unreasonable in this case to take the car to the station house.
All occupants in the car were arrested in a dark parking lot in the middle
of the night. A careful search at that point was impractical and perhaps
not safe for the officers . . .79
The import of Chambers on the question of exigency seems to be that if
the right to make a warrantless search once vests at the curbside, it will
not be divested simply because the police choose to execute that search a
short time later and a short distance away under safer and more commodious circumstances.
H.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire

80
Coolidge v. New Hampshire
is a veritable encyclopedia of fourth
amendment law. Part IIB thereof"' deals with the Carroll Doctrine.
Coolidge did nothing to constrict the warrantless station-house-search rationale of Chambers, but it did throw a dash of cold water upon the police
and prosecutors who had, during the intervening year, been reading that
aspect of Chambers overbroadly. "The word 'automobile' is not a talisman
'82
in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.
The most prominent feature to be noted about Coolidge is that it was a
strange vehicle by which to examine various warrantless theories for the
simple reason that it came to the Supreme Court as a warrant case. Ample
probable cause had been accumulated to justify the issuance of an arrest
warrant for Edward Coolidge and the issuance of search and seizure warrants for his home and for both of his automobiles. Those warrants were
issued and were executed. Every "i" was dotted and every "t"was crossed.
The only defect, and so the Supreme Court found in Part I of the Coolidge
opinion, was that the warrants were issued by the Attorney General of New
Hampshire who was not a "neutral and detached magistrate." 3 The State
of New Hampshire put forth at the Supreme Court level three alternative

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 51-52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428, 429.
Id. at 52, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 429, n. 10.
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
Id. at 458-64, 91 S.Ct. at 2033-37, 29 L.Ed.2d at 578-81.
Id. at 461, 91 S.Ct. at 2035, 29 L.Ed.2d at 580.
Id. at 449-53, 91 S.Ct. at 2029-31, 29 L.Ed.2d at 572-575.
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warrantless theories as "drop back" positions to be resorted to only in case
the warrant was held to be defective.
When the warrant was held to be defective, the plurality opinion of
Justice Stewart turned attention to the alternative warrantless theories.
The first of these was that the search of the Pontiac in question would have
been permissible warrantlessly as an incident of Coolidge's arrest. The
third of these was that the search of the car would have been permissible
warrantlessly under the Plain View Doctrine. Both of these alternative
theories were found wanting. The "search incident" rationale was of no
avail because the search was not contemporaneous in time with the arrest
and because it was, in any event, beyond the permitted search perimeter
as measured from the arrestee. 4 The Plain View Doctrine was of no avail
primarily because the search in question ran afoul of the inadvertence
requirement."
As an arguable alternative theory, the "search incident" argument can,
of course, be made consistently with an argument based upon the search
warrant." The same probable cause that would support the warrant would
also support, for the proper crimes, a warrantless arrest. A search, appropriately contemporaneous and appropriately limited in geographic scope,
could follow as a warrantless incident of that arrest.
It is the second of the alternative warrantless theories put forth by the
State of New Hampshire which concerns us here. This was the argument
that a warrantless search of the Pontiac could be justified under the Carroll
Doctrine. The argument did not merit the attention which it received
because it was, under the facts of the Coolidge case, untenable on its face.
The bedrock foundation of the Carroll Doctrine is that a warrantless
"search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile"8 is sometimes permissible under circumstances "where it is not practicable to secure a warrant
because the vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction
in which the warrant must be sought."88 It is permissible because the car
is "movable, the occupants are alerted, and the car's contents may never
be found again if a warrant must be obtained."89 It was simply an absurdity
84. Id. at 455-57, 91 S.Ct. at 2032-33, 29 L.Ed.2d at 576-78. Actually, it was held to be
beyond even the pre-Chimel search perimeter under the authority of Preston v. United States,
376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964).
85. 403 U.S. at 464-73, 91 S.Ct. at 2037-42, 29 L.Ed.2d at 581-87.
86. The same probably cannot be said about the alternative theory based upon the Plain
View Doctrine. The very probable cause that leads to the issuance of a warrant for the search
for particularized items in a designated place and the seizure of those items negates, by
definition, the notion that the items when found are found inadvertently. One cannot find
evidence inadvertently when he has sworn that he has probable cause to believe that, if
permitted to search, he will find such evidence.
87. 403 U.S. at 459, 91 S.Ct. at 2034, 29 L.Ed.2d at 579, quoting from Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551.
88. 403 U.S. at 460, 91 S.Ct. at 2034, 29 L.Ed.2d at 579, quoting from Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 551. (Emphasis supplied in Coolidge).
89. 403 U.S. at 460, 91 S.Ct. at 2035, 29 L.Ed.2d at 579, quoting from Chambers v.
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for the State of New Hampshire to argue that it was unable to get a
warrant in a situation where it in fact got a warrant (albeit a defective one).
An argument based upon the Carroll Doctrine was patently incompatible
with the undisputed facts and with the main thrust of New Hampshire's
case. Nonetheless, the plurality opinion did consider this alternative
theory upon its merits and, in the course of that consideration, gave us the
clearest exposition to date of the Carroll Doctrine itself and its rationale
and an articulate explanation of the effect of Chambers upon Carroll.
The first of Carroll's necessary conditions-probable cause-presented
no problem in Coolidge. There was ample probable cause to believe that
the Pontiac contained evidence of crime. 0 The same probable cause that
supported the defective search warrant for the automobile also would have
supported a warrantless search under Carroll if the other condition of
exigency had also been satisfied.
The critical failing of the Carroll Doctrine alternative in Coolidge was
the absence of exigency. Coolidge is the first and last case in the 51-year
history of the Carroll Doctrine where a warrantless automobile search was
held to be unconstitutional because of the absence of exigency. It is a good
vehicle in this regard, for it illustrates the principle that we must look both
forward and backward in time from the point where the confrontation
between the policeman and the suspect vehicle occurs. Normally, as is well
illustrated by Carroll and Brinegar and Chambers, the police come upon
the suspect vehicle and its occupants suddenly and unexpectedly. As they
arrest or otherwise accost the occupants, their critical question becomes,
"Do we now have a reasonable opportunity to get a search warrant or is
the vehicle likely to disappear if we do not search it immediately?" The
evaluation of exigency is made by looking forward. As Coolidge well illustrates, however, where the police-vehicle encounter is neither random nor
chance but is deliberately initiated by the police on the basis of preexisting probable cause, exigency must be evaluated by looking backward
as well as forward. The critical question becomes, "Was there a reasonable
opportunity to obtain a search warrant before bringing on this encounter?"
Were this not so, the police could always obviate the warrant requirement
by deliberately creating exigent circumstances. No matter how long they
had possessed their probable cause to search the vehicle, they could always
move in and arrest the vehicle's owner, request a consent to search which
would not be forthcoming, or otherwise alert him as to their suspicions and
then claim a real exigency measured only from that moment forward.
Palpably, exigency must be evaluated by looking in both directions along
the time scale. A reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant either before
or after the critical encounter will negate exigency.
Maroney, 399 U.S. at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428.
90. That probable cause was most fully set out by Justice Black in his concurring and
dissenting opinion at 403 U.S. 493-495, 91 S.Ct. at 2051-52, 29 L.Ed.2d at 598-600 (Black, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
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The critical encounter from which we look forward and back in this case
was the daytime arrest of Ed Coolidge just inside the front door of his home
on February 19, 1964. He was placed in custody and taken to the station
house. His 1951 Pontiac was parked in the driveway in front of the house.
Mrs. Coolidge was at home.
Because of the unusual posture in which the alternative warrantless
theories had to be considered, Coolidge's conclusion of non-exigency measured from the arrest forward is analytically very unsatisfying. If we are
asked to hypothesize the nonexistence of the warrant; an exigent threat to
the automobile posed by Mrs. Coolidge would appear to have been very
real. The historic facts relied upon by Justice Stewart to obviate this threat
would have represented unconstitutionally heavy-handed police conduct if
there had been no warrant and if there was no right for the police to seize
the automobile warrantlessly under Carrolland Chambers. Mrs. Coolidge
asked initially whether she and her child might remain in the house. With
no apparent justification, she was told that she must stay elsewhere." She
then asked whether she might take her car. She was informed that both
cars had been "impounded." 2 It is clear that we cannot hypothesize what
might have happened had there been no warrant. The very existence of the
warrant makes a warrantless analysis in this situation impossible. The
police seized the automobile under what they believed to be a validly
issued search and seizure warrant. The validity of that warrant was later
twice upheld by the Supreme Court of New Hampshire. Indeed, more
than seven years went by between the issuance of the warrant on February
19, 1964, and the Supreme Court decision on June 21, 1971, before anyone
realized that the warrant, under authority of which the police seized the
Pontiac, was not a valid one. The police refusal of the right to use the car
to Mrs. Coolidge was based upon their belief that they had seized the car
under a valid warrant. We are guilty of circular reasoning if we predicate
the absence of a peril that would justify a police seizure of the vehicle upon
the fact that the police had already seized the vehicle. It is tantamount to
saying that it is no longer necessary to do that which is already done. If
the warrant was invalid for the search and seizure of the Pontiac, it was
invalid to deny Mrs. Coolidge the right to use that Pontiac. Absent that
denial, she would have posed a threat to the car and its contents. We
cannot predicate non-exigency upon unlawful police behavior.
The conclusion of non-exigency in Coolidge is far more satisfying, however, when looking from the moment of arrest backward in time. The
91. Id. at 447, 91 S.Ct. at 2028, 29 L.Ed.2d at 572.
92. Id.
93. In State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322 (1965), the New Hampshire Supreme
Court ruled that the evidence was admissible, after the trial judge referred the pretrial motion
to suppress the evidence to that court. After Coolidge was convicted in the trial court, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed that conviction in State v. Coolidge, 109 N.H. 403,
260 A.2d 547 (1969).
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opinion makes it clear that the probable cause for the arrest of Coolidge
and for the search of his home and vehicles had been accumulating for 2
1/2 weeks before February 19. The investigation had been completed in
ample time to put the probable cause down on paper, as was done, and
submit it to an appropriate judicial figure, as was not done.14 New Hampshire could not claim to have been unable to have obtained a proper warrant since it clearly had time to obtain an improper one. The improper one
was no less time-consuming than a proper one would have been.
Coolidge is instructive for the light which it throws upon Chambers. It
makes it clear that simply towing an automobile to the station house does
not legitimate a warrantless search of the automobile. Chambers stands
only for the principle that if, based upon probable cause plus exigency, the
right to make a warrantless Carroll Doctrine search once accrues, that
police prerogative will not be lost by virtue of the trip to the station house.
In Coolidge, had the police possessed the right to make a warrantless
search of the Pontiac as it was parked in the driveway, that right would
have continued even after the car was towed to the station house, under
the authority of Chambers. The critical factor in Coolidge, making
Chambers inapplicable, is that there was no right under the Carroll Doctrine to make a warrantless search of the Pontiac even if it had been done
immediately after the arrest right where it was parked in the driveway. The
Court reasoned:
Since Carroll would not have justified a warrantless search of the Pontiac at the time Coolidge was arrested, the later search at the station house
was plainly illegal, at least so far as the automobile exception is concerned. Chambers, supra, is of no help to the State, since that case held
only that, where the police may stop and search an automobile under
Carroll, they may also seize it and search it later at the police station.'"
Justice Stewart went on, in answering a dissenting argument by Justice
Black, to make very clear the limits of the Chambers doctrine:
On its face, Chambers purports to deal only with situations in which the
police may legitimately make a warrantless search under Carrollv. United
States . . . . Since the Carroll rule does not apply in the circumstances
of this case, the police could not have searched the car without a warrant
when they arrested Coolidge. . . . It is true that the actual search of the
automobile in Chambers was made at the police station many hours after
the car had been stopped on the highway, when the car was no longer
movable, any "exigent circumstances" had passed, and, for all the record
shows, there was a magistrate easily available. Nonetheless, the analogy
to this case is misleading. The rationale of Chambers is that given a
justified initial intrusion, there is little difference between a search on the
94.
95.

403 U.S. at 446-47, 91 S.Ct. at 2027-28, 29 L.Ed.2d at 571-72.
Id. at 463, 91 S.Ct. at 2036, 29 L.Ed.2d at 581.
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open highway and a later search at the station. Here, we deal with the
prior question of whether the initial intrusion is justified."
Upon a close reading, there is no remote incompatibility between
Chambers and Coolidge.
I.

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States

Almeida-Sanchez v. United States7 in 1973 dealt primarily with the
circumstances under which more latitudinous investigative techniques
were and were not permitted when dealing with border searches and functional equivalents of borders. In passing, however, the opinion did treat
briefly the Carroll Doctrine, in holding that the warrantless automobile
search before it could not be justified under that doctrine.
Almeida-Sanchez was stopped by the United States Border Patrol as he
was driving along a California highway which paralleled the Mexican border and which was about 25 miles north of the border. The Border Patrol
searched his automobile without a warrant. Marijuana was found and
Almeida-Sanchez was convicted of "having knowingly received, concealed
and facilitated the transportation of a large quantity of illegally imported
marijuana."" Before going on to the border search prerogatives, which the
Court held were not available to the governmental officials in this case, the
Court pointed out that "there was no probable cause of any kind for the
stop or the subsequent search."" It held unequivocally that the Carroll
Doctrine had not been complied with as a possible legitimation for the
warrantless search in this case:
No claim is made, nor could one be, that the search of the petitioner's
car was constitutional under any previous decision of this Court involving
the search of an automobile. It is settled, of course, that a stop and search
of a moving automobile can be made without a warrant. That narrow
exception to the warrant requirement was first established in Carroll v.
United States. . . . Carroll has been followed in a line of subsequent
cases, but the Carroll doctrine does not declare a field day for the police
in searching automobiles. Automobile or no automobile, there must be
probable cause for the search.'
J.

Texas v. White

The most recent treatment of the CarrollDoctrine by the Supreme Court
was its decision in Texas v. White,'' handed down on December 1, 1975.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Id. at 463, 91 S.Ct. at 2036, 29 L.Ed.2d at 581, n.20 (citation omitted).
413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973).
Id. at 267, 93 S.Ct. at 2536, 37 L.Ed.2d at 599.
Id. at 268, 93 S. Ct. at 2537, 37 L.Ed.2d at 599-600.
Id. at 269, 93 S.Ct. at 2537-38, 37 L.Ed.2d at 600-601 (citation omitted).
423 U.S. , 96 S.Ct. 304, 46 L.Ed.2d 209 (1975).
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It was a per curiam opinion speaking for six members of the Court. White
was arrested at 1:30 in the afternoon as he was attempting to pass fraudulent checks at a drive-in window of the First National Bank in Amarillo,
Texas. Ten minutes before arresting White, the Amarillo police had been
informed by another bank that a man meeting White's description and
driving an automobile exactly matching that of White had tried to pass
four checks drawn on a nonexistent account. The arresting officers ordered
White to park his automobile at the curb. While parking the car, he was
observed attempting to "stuff" something between the seats. As he was
being removed from the scene, one of the officers drove his car to the
station house. There it was searched without a warrant, and four wrinkled
checks were recovered and later were introduced in evidence.0 2
Neither the majority nor the two-man dissent'03 questioned the existence
of probable cause, nor did the dissent question the exigency which would
have justified a warrantless search at the curbside at the place where the
arrest was made. The dispute between the majority and the dissent was
over the interpretation of Chambers. Justice Marshall read Chambers as
permitting a station house warrantless search only after the State had
demonstrated the necessity for removing the vehicle from the curbside to
the station house. He interpreted Chambers as follows:
Chambers did not hold, as the Court suggests, "that police officers with
probable cause to search an automobile on the scene where it was stopped
could constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a warrant."... Chambers simply held that to be the rule when it is
reasonable to take the car to the station house in the first place. 0
Applying that interpretation to the facts of the case, Justice Marshall
reasoned that the police had not demonstrated any reasonable grounds
justifying the removal of the car from the curbside to the station house:
In this case, the arrest took place at 1:30 in the afternoon, and there is
no indication that an immediate search would have been either impractical or unsafe for the arresting officers.'0'
The seizure and removal here was not for the purpose of immobilizing the
car until a warrant could be secured, nor was it for the purpose of facilitating a safe and thorough search of the car."'1
Rejecting the dissenting arguinent, the majority implied that the police
102. Id. at __,
96 S.Ct. at 305, 46 L.Ed.2d at 211.
103. Justice Marshall wrote a dissenting opinion, joined in by Justice Brennan, 423 U.S.
at -, 96 S.Ct. at 305, 46 L.Ed.2d at 212.
104. 423 U.S. at , 96 S.Ct. at 305-06, 46 L.Ed.2d at 212 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(citation omitted).
105. Id. at -,
96 S.Ct. at 306, 46 L.Ed.2d at 212-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at
, 96 S.Ct. at 307, 46 L.Ed.2d at 214 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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option of a station house search instead of a curbside search is automatically available with no further justification required:
In Chambers v. Maroney we held that police officers with probable
cause to search an automobile on the scene where it was stopped could
constitutionally do so later at the station house without first obtaining a
warrant. There, as here, "It]he probable cause factor" that developed
on the scene "still obtained at the station house." . . . The Court of

Criminal Appeals erroneously excluded the evidence seized from the
search at the station house in light of the trial judge's finding, undisturbed
by the appellate court, that there was probable cause to search respondent's car."7
One could quarrel not so much with the result but with the careless non
sequitur that supported it. The key issue in the Chambers extension of
Carroll was not whether the probable cause "still obtained at the station
house" (obviously it must, unless some sneak thief slips into the car under
the eyes of the police and pirates away the evidence while the car is in
transit), but rather whether the exigency "still obtained at the station
house." The Chambers battle was fought over that element of the doctrine,
not over the element of probable cause.
This then is the Carroll Doctrine.5 5 As an exception to the warrant
requirement, it establishes that the police may make a warrantless search
of an automobile or an automobile equivalent whenever there is (1) probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence of crime and
107. Id. at __ , 96 S.Ct. at 305, 46 L.Ed.2d at 211-12 (emphasis supplied).
108. Although it deals with an issue tangential to the run-of-the-mill automobile search
cases, the Supreme Court decision in United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Ct. 222, 92
L.Ed. 210 (1948), unquestionably involves an aspect of the Carroll Doctrine and will be
summarized here for the sake of completeness. The issue there was whether the right to make
a warrantless search of an automobile confers the incidental right to "search any occupant
of such car when the contraband sought is of a character that might be concealed on the
person." 332 U.S. at 584, 68 S.Ct. at 223, 92 L.Ed. at 215. The Supreme Court, with Justice
Jackson writing for seven members of the Court, held unequivocally that no such incidental
right was conferred. He posed the question squarely:
Assuming, however, without deciding, that there was reasonable cause for searching the car, did it confer an incidental right to search Di Re? It is admitted by the
Government that there is no authority to that effect, either in the statute or in
precedent decision of this Court, but we are asked to extend the assumed right of
car search to include the person of occupants because "common sense demands that
such right exist in a case such as this where the contraband sought is a small article
which could easily be concealed on the person."
332 U.S. at 586, 68 S.Ct. at 224, 92 L.Ed. at 216.
He then answered the question squarely:
We see no ground for expanding the ruling in the Carroll case to justify this arrest
and search as incident to the search of a car. We are not convinced that a person,
by mere presence in a suspected car, loses immunities from search of his person to
which he would otherwise be entitled.
332 U.S. at 587, 68 S.Ct. at 225, 92 L.Ed. at 216.
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(2) an exigency arising out of the imminent or likely disappearance of the
automobile. The Chambers addition to that doctrine provides that once
the right to make the warrantless search accrues at the curbside, it will not
be lost by the simple police expedient of removing the car to the station
house before executing the warrantless search.
In this survey of Supreme Court case law on the CarrollDoctrine, there
was scrupulous avoidance of any mention of Preston v. United States,"9
0
Cooper v. California,"1
Harris v. United States,"' Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co. ," Cady v. Dombrowski"' or Cardwell v. Lewis."' This was
not an oversight. They are not (or are not primarily) CarrollDoctrine cases.
To attempt to squeeze them into the mold of the Carroll Doctrine would
serve only to stretch that doctrine so hopelessly out of shape as to render
it absolutely meaningless as a legal principle and to strip it of all possible
utility.
They all, to be sure, involved searches of or seizures from what our
mechanics and teen-aged sons would recognize as automobiles, but they
involved constitutional criteria other than probable cause and exigency. If
"[tihe word 'automobile' is not a talisman in whose presence the Fourth
Amendment fades away and disappears,""15 neither is the word "automobile" a talisman in whose presence every exception to the warrant requirement other than the automobile exception-every doctrine other than the
Carroll Doctrine-fades away and disappears. Let us now examine some
of the other exceptions to the warrant requirement-some of the other
doctrines-that sometimes justify investigative probes into the fourwheeled chariot that symbolizes life in 20th century America.
Ii.

WHEN THE CARROLL DOCTRINE BOTH APPLIES AND APPLIES NOT: THE

FREQUENT OVERLAP BETWEEN THE CARROLL DOCTRINE AND THE "SEARCH
INCIDENT" EXCEPTION

One of the worst sources of the law's confusion is the uncritical mixing
of doctrines that do not combine. This uncritical mixing frequently occurs
when "search incident" analysis overlaps CarrollDoctrine analysis. In the
typical case of a warrantless automobile search, the same probable cause
that points to the likely presence of evidence in the vehicle points also to
the likely guilt of the driver or one of the passengers. Both "search incident" law and Carroll Doctrine law have possible utility in analyzing the
warrantless search. The fact that two rationales may have applicability to
a given set of circumstances does not imply, however, that the rationales
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

376
386
390
391
413
417
403

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964).
58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).
216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968).
433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974).
at 461, 91 S.Ct. at 325, 29 L.Ed.2d at 580.
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merge into some super-rationale. They retain their separate identities.
Each is measured by a different set of constitutional criteria. Each involves
distinct guidelines. Even when they overlap, they must be analyzed independently. Between the resolution and the act, however, falls the shadow.
It is the particular responsibility of appellate judges who create the
precedents to keep the analysis clean-to keep the compartments watertight. If the thought is clean in the first instance, the devices for putting
the thought cleanly upon paper are not wanting. They include not simply
words but punctuation, paragraphing, numbering and even subheads. All
too frequently, however, search incident criteria and Carroll Doctrine criteria are intertwined in one analytically inextricable mess. A sound rule
of thumb for the common law reader would be to take any opinion in which
reference to both Carroll and Chimel is made in a single paragraph, let
alone in a single sentence, and to consign that opinion politely but expeditiously to the nearest trashcan. It is a sure sign that someone has scrambled the eggs of doctrinal analysis. Once those eggs are scrambled, no
reader on earth, in search of precedential guidance, can ever unscramble
them again.
We must remember that although the two exceptions to the warrant
requirement may overlap in a given case, they do not combine. They may
not justify together what one could not justify separately. All confusion
could be avoided if we would apply two analyses sequentially instead of
one analysis collectively.
No matter how tangled a set of facts, when we analyze those facts under
the Carroll Doctrine we are interested in but two things: (1) Was there
probable cause to believe that the automobile contained evidence? and (2)
Was there an exigency requiring an immediate warrantless search? Stick
to the checklist! We do not care one whit whether the driver or any of his
passengers were arrested at all, let alone whether they were arrested lawfully. We do not care where the driver or passengers are located at the time
of the search. They may still be in the car; they may be shackled in a police
car a hundred yards away; they may be shot dead in the middle of the
street; they may be in jail. Such questions are irrelevant under the Carroll
Doctrine.
When we have finished that analysis and move on to a distinct analysis
under the "search incident" exception, however, such questions suddenly
become important. We are looking to the legality of an underlying arrest.
We are looking to that floating zone of reachability, lungeability or graspability-that Chimel wingspread-which radiates like an eight-foot halo out
from the person of the arrestee. His location becomes vitally important. On
the other hand, probable cause to believe that evidence will be found loses
its significance. No such justification is required for a search incident,
which follows automatically from a lawful arrest. '6 Similarly, the question
116. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 94 S.Ct. 467, 38L.Ed.2d 427 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 94 S.Ct. 488, 38 L.Ed.2d 465 (1973).
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of exigency loses all relevance. It is not a necessary condition to a warrantless arrest or to its attendant search incident. All the opportunity in the
world to obtain a warrant will not defeat a warrantless arrest or a warrantless search incident to that arrest."' We are concerned only with the
status, as a lawful arrestee, of the person searched and with the restricted
compass of the search incident-the two things which suddenly take on a
significance under "search incident" law which they lacked under Carroll
Doctrine analysis.
The tricky thing to remember about a "search incident" in an automobile is that the automobile itself has no significance at all except insofar
as it constricts the ability of the arrestee to reach, lunge or grasp for
weapons or destructible evidence. The arrest of a driver does not confer the
right to search the interior of his automobile as an incident of the arrest.
The automobile of the arrested motorist is neither automatically included
in whole, automatically included in part and excluded in part, nor automatically excluded in whole from the permissible search perimeter.
Rather, each case must be analyzed individually in light of the purposes
giving life to the "search incident" exception, as one measures the perimeter necessary to serve those purposes. The area within the reach, the lunge
or the grasp of the arrestee-the area "which may fairly be deemed to be
an extension of his person""-may intrude upon some, or even all,
automobile space, just as it intrudes upon non-automobile space. Conversely, it may not. The word "automobile" is also not a talisman for
purposes of automatic inclusion or exclusion of an automobile after the
arrest of its driver. It is simply so much cubic footage of air space through
which a perimeter measured from an arrestee-be he motorist, passenger
or pedestrian-may or may not pass.
A "search incident" that takes place totally or partially inside an automobile is no different analytically than any other "search incident." A
driver arrested behind his steering wheel may or may not be able to lunge
beneath the passenger seat or into the back seat just as a homeowner
arrested on his sofa may or may not be able to lunge beneath the cushions
at the far end of the sofa or into a nearby desk. A driver removed to some
safe distance from his car may no longer reach, lunge or grasp into it for
weapons or to destroy evidence anymore than a homeowner removed to a
safe distance from his house may any longer reach, lunge or grasp into it
for weapons or to destroy evidence. A closed trunk may be beyond the
driver's Chimel wingspan just as an adjacent room is beyond the homeowner's Chimel wingspan. A Chimel perimeter obviously radiates out over
a greater portion of a small house than of a large house, just as it radiates
out over a greater portion of a Volkswagen than of a Lincoln Continental
117. United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. -, 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d 598 (1976).
118. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 73, 70 S.Ct. 430, 438, 94 L.Ed. 653, 664
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).

19761

1015

AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION

or a stationwagon. The point is that the automobile is simply the coincidental locus in which we apply a Chimel analysis and not a crucial factor
calling for some special analysis of its own under Carroll. Carroll, which
deals with the warrantless search of an automobile as the search of the
automobile, has nothing whatsoever to do with the coincidental fact that
an automobile may fall within a Chimel perimeter under "search incident"
law.
As with the crossbreeding of a black chicken and a white chicken under
Mendel's law, so also with the overlap of "search incident" analysis and
Carroll Doctrine analysis when an automobile has been searched warrantlessly. There are four possible products. The warrantless search may be
good under both theories; it may be good under the first but bad under the
second; it may be bad under the first but good under the second; it may
be bad under both.
Happiness is a professor with a chart:

GOOD SEARCH INCIDENT

BAD SEARCH INCIDENT

AND

BUT

GOOD CARROLL DOCTRINE

GOOD CARROLL DOCTRINE

GOOD SEARCH INCIDENT

BAD SEARCH INCIDENT

BUT

AND

BAD CARROLL DOCTRINE

BAD CARROLL DOCTRINE

Overlap of "Search Incident" Law and the Carroll Doctrine

Four instances of the overlap will be offered as illustrations of the possible combinations of results. They are taken from actual cases decided by
the Maryland Court of Special Appeals, but they deal with general constitutional law and not with parochial Maryland law. They have been selected because the author is intimately familiar with them and because the
opinion writer in the cases had no choice but to practice what the author
of this article preaches.
A.

Good Search Incident and Good CarrollDoctrine

9
well illustrates a situation where the
The case of Peterson v. State"'
warrantless search of two automobiles was good under each of the two
rationales independently. A veteran of the Narcotics Section of the Prince
George's County Police Department established a discreet observation
point overlooking the parking lot of a shopping center in an area known

119.

15 Md. App. 478, 292 A.2d 714 (1972).
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for its heavy narcotics traffic. Shortly after 9:30 a.m. he observed first one
and then a second automobile park themselves side by side upon the lot.
One was occupied by four individuals, the other by two. Throughout a long
day of observation that continued until 3:30 p.m., a heavy and consistent
traffic pattern was observed as a number of probable customers, some
known narcotics addicts, approached one or the other of the vehicles,
handed over currency, received in return what appeared to be aluminum
foil packets, and departed after encounters of approximately one minute
in duration. By 3:30 p.m., the observing detective had seen enough to
convince him that all six individuals were engaged in the business of dispensing narcotic drugs and that both automobiles were being used as dispensing stations. He placed a call to his waiting cavalry and they, in squad
cars, immediately moved in. Simultaneously, all six suspects were arrested
and ordered to "spread-eagle" with their hands against the roof of the car
as each stood by the door from which he had alighted. As they were being
searched, the interiors of the two automobiles were also being searched and
the automobiles yielded a significant "stash" of heroin. After convictions
in the trial court, the question before the Court of Special Appeals was the
constitutionality of the warrantless searches of the two automobiles. The
court prefaced its analysis by announcing its holding that "the search for
and the seizure of [the evidence] . . . is constitutionally sound upon
either of two independent rationales."1 0 The court then proceeded to analyze the warrantless search according to the "search incident" exception:
Detective Beavers' search of the automobile was a legitimate incident
of the lawful arrests of its occupants. Chimel v. California . . . makes
clear that a "search incident" extends not simply to the person of the
arrestee but also to the surrounding area within "his immediate control"-the fair "extension of his person"-the area within his reasonable
grasp or reach within which he might grab or lunge for a weapon or within
which he might be able to destroy evidence. Where four arrestees are
ordered from a vehicle and are braced against it for a search, where two
others are being arrested several feet away, and where the doors of the
vehicle are still open, the contemporaneous survey by Detective Beavers
of the interior of that automobile is, we hold, within the legitimate search
perimeter of these particular lawful arrests. This is particularly so with
evidence as readily destructible as heroin. The search here followed the
arrests instantaneously and was of the very spot where Peterson was sitting at the moment of his arrest and was within several feet of where he
was standing at the moment of the search. The seizure here was the
product of a legitimate "search incident." ''
The underlying arrests had already been held to have been lawful. Scrupu-

120.
121.

Id. at 489, 292 A.2d at 721.
Id. (citation omitted).
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lously, no mention was made of any such extraneous consideration as
exigency.
A change of paragraph then signaled the analytical shifting of gears:
Completely independent of the "search incident" rationale, the search
of the Pontiac here was constitutional, we hold, under the so-called "automobile exception" to the warrant requirement. Carroll v. United States
S. ..

The first of the two necessary preconditions-the existence of prob-

able cause to believe that the automobile contained contraband or other
evidence of crime-has already been broadly discussed hereinbefore. We
hold that the second necessary precondition-the existence of exigent circumstances-was also present. The automobile was upon a parking lot
open to the public. Four persons were arrested from that automobile immediately prior to its search. It was mobile. Even with its occupants
moving into-custody, it was vulnerable in its position to confederates in
the well-organized underworld of the narcotics traffic. Its suspected contents were readily destructible. In that bustling marketplace of narcotics
users, it was further an inviting target for theft by any tempted or oppor1 22

tunistic "junkie."

The aforegoing demonstrated exigency measured from the moment of the
crucial encounter forward. The court also considered exigency measured
from that point backward, finding that there had been no reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant before signaling for "the charge" at 3:30
p.m.:
[W]e are, by no means, persuaded that it was feasible in the case at bar
to obtain a search warrant for the Pontiac. Detective Snow was in a tactically difficult field situation. His probable cause was slowly, if surely,
accumulating over the course of the day's observations. He could not be
certain when he had enough and could safely curtail the accumulation.
New parties were entering into the illicit picture. Departures from the
crime scene could be sudden. His had to be the tactical judgment of when
to spring the trap, a decision wherein dispatch was of the essence and
where delay might well have imperiled the success of the mission. The
situation at bar does not remotely resemble that in Coolidge.'1
Of the Supreme Court cases which have involved the overlapping of the
two exceptions to the warrant requirement, that of United States v. Lee' 2
is the one where a warrantless search of an automobile equivalent (a motorboat) was good both as a search incident to lawful arrest and, quite independently, under the CarrollDoctrine.
122. Id. at 491, 292 A.2d at 722. (citation omitted).
123. Id. at 492, 292 A.2d at 723.
124. 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927). See text accompanying notes 39-43
supra.
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Bad Search Incident and Bad CarrollDoctrine

At the antipodes of the chart of possibilities is the case of Martin v.
State."' At issue in Martin was the warrantless search of an automobile
driven by Martin which produced a stolen gun which linked him to an
armed robbery which had been perpetrated 5 1/2months earlier in Charles
County, Maryland. The search in issue was perpetrated by members of the
Metropolitan Police Department of the District of Columbia. Two officers
were on routine patrol at approximately 11 p.m. in a commercial area. As
they passed the Capitol Cadillac storage lot, a fenced-in area with a chain
across the entrance, they observed two individuals, one of whom turned out
to be Martin, duck down behind a vehicle stored on the lot. The officers
proceeded onward out of view. They reversed their direction and returned.
They saw the two men previously observed leaving the lot. They stopped
them and frisked them. Winning the "stop and frisk" battle did the State
no ultimate good since the court held that "[t]he difficulty with the
State's 'stop and frisk' theory is that it 'dead ends' and does not carry them
the next necessary step. The search of the appellant's nearby automobile
cannot be justified as part of the 'stop and frisk.' "26 The frisk of Martin
produced nothing incriminating.
Both Martin and his companion were arrested. Parked across the street
was a 1971 Plymouth. Martin acknowledged that the car was in his possession. It was unnecessary to decide the legality of the, at best, questionable
underlying arrest, since the court held that the parked automobile was
not, in any event, within the arrestee's Chimel perimeter and could not be
searched as an incident of the arrest:
It is clear, however, that even a valid arrest upon the street will not justify,
as an incident of that arrest, the thorough search of an automobile some
appreciable distance away. Chimel v.California ...7
The court then went on and held, quite independently, that the warrantless search of the automobile could not be justified under the CarrollDoctrine since, although exigency may have been present at that time and
place, there was no probable cause to believe that the automobile contained evidence of crime."'
Two of the Supreme Court cases which have involved the overlapping
of the two exceptions to the warrant requirement have been ones where the
warrantless search of an automobile was bad both under search incident
theory and under the Carroll Doctrine. They were Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.'29 and Coolidge v. New Hampshire2 0
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

18 Md.App. 112, 305 A.2d 197 (1973).
Id. at 114, 305 A.2d at 199.
Id. at 115, 305 A.2d at 199 (citation omitted).
Id. at 115-16, 305 A.2d at 199-200.
391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968). See text accompanying notes 191-

193 supra.
130. 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971). See text accompanying notes 8096 supra and text accompanying notes 199-203 supra.
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Bad Search Incident But Good Carroll Doctrine

The case of Soles v. State'" is a good factual example of a warrantless
automobile search which cannot be justified under "search incident"
theory but which is nonetheless good under the CarrollDoctrine. Narcotics
officers of the District of Columbia and of nearby Prince George's County,
Maryland, received reliable information from a tested informant, buttressed by independent information of their own, that Soles would be
making a "midnight run" from Washington to New York City in the early
morning hours of September 19, 1971. They trailed him and intercepted
him shortly after he had crossed the Maryland line. A warrantless search
of the trunk of his automobile produced about $32,000 worth of highquality cocaine. He was convicted. In analyzing the constitutionality of
that warrantless search, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals scrutinized it initially under the microscope of the "search incident" exception
and found it to be wanting:
The appellant was alone in his automobile when he was stopped. He was
arrested and ordered to alight from his vehicle. He was directed to produce
the keys to the trunk, with which the police opened the locked trunk.
Underneath some clothing, they discovered a dark-colored briefcase. It
was locked. After the appellant failed to produce a key for the briefcase,
the police snapped it open. Much of the incriminating evidence was found
inside the briefcase. The rest had been found inside the locked trunk. In
any event, the search could not qualify as a "search incident" to a lawful
arrest, which must be limited in geographic scope to the person of the
arrestee and the immediately surrounding area "which may fairly be
deemed to be an extension of his person." Chimel v. California .... 32
Losing a battle, however, is not losing the war. The court then placed
the problem under the very different analytical scrutiny of the Carroll
Doctrine:
If the warrantless search of the automobile is to pass constitutional muster, it must qualify rather under the so-called "automobile exception,"
Carroll v. United States . . .to the basic proposition that "searches con-

ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment." Katz
v. United States. . . .The necessary conditions for such qualification are
1) probable cause to believe that the automobile contains evidence of

crime and 2) exigent circumstances making the warrant procedure impractical and making the resort to the warrantless search reasonable and
necessary. Chambers v. Maroney . . . Coolidge v. New Hampshire
133

131.
132.
133.

16 Md.App. at 656, 299 A.2d 502 (1973).
Id. at 659-60, 299 A.2d at 505. (citation omitted).
Id. at 660, 299 A.2d at 505. (citations omitted).
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After an extended analysis' of the informant's "credibility" and "basis
of knowledge" under Aguilar'3 and Spinelli, 31 the court weighed his very
detailed information, combined with three additional items of independent police knowledge, and found that there was "probable cause to believe that the appellant's automobile contained cocaine and other evidence of narcotics violations.' 3 The court then had to consider, under
Carroll, the independent element of exigency. Having stopped a car on a
well-traveled thoroughfare at approximately 3 a.m. just outside Washington, D.C., exigency measured from that moment forward was not difficult
to find. It was the exigency measured from that point backward in time
that required a more detailed analysis to demonstrate that there had not
been a reasonable opportunity to obtain a warrant:
Probable cause having been established, we look to the question of
exigency. On the record before us, the only information properly available
to the police prior to 12:30 a.m. on September 19, was that a late model
blue convertible with New York license tags was on a single occasion
parked in the unit block of Sheridan Street. That was palpably not enough
to establish probable cause for an automobile search. The threshold of
probable cause was crossed only with the call to Officer Womack at 12:30
a.m. on September 19. At that point, Womack was at his home in Alexandria. Officer Polzin was also at home. The information from the informant
was that the appellant would be moving at some time "before 3 a.m."
Even in the face of such exigency, Officer Polzin placed a telephone call
to Assistant U.S. Attorney Robert Crimmins, who was at home in bed. Mr.
Crimmins advised the officer to proceed against the appellant and his
automobile without a warrant. Mr. Crimmins testified at the suppression
hearing. He testified that the obtaining of a search warrant in the middle
of the night in the District of Columbia would probably take between two
and three hours. He stated that, under ideal conditions, it would take an
absolute minimum of one hour. He pointed out that the officers in this
case would have had to get dressed and then driven to their headquarters
to begin typing up an affidavit. He outlined the necessity for then going
to the Superior Court Building to try to locate the necessary warrant
forms. He then pointed out that the officers would have to ascertain the
identity of and make contact with the "nighttime judge." The officers
would then have to travel to that judge's home to present the warrant
application to him.
It is clear to us that Officer Womack and Officer Polzin were faced with
exigent circumstances, not only permitting but demanding immediate
action, 31
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id. at 660-665, 299 A.2d at 505-08.
Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964).
Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
16 Md.App. at 667, 299 A.2d at 509.
Id. at 667-68, 299 A.2d at 509.
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Of the Supreme Court cases which have involved the overlapping of the
two exceptions to the warrant requirement, Chambers v. Maroney'39 is the
one wherein a warrantless search of an automobile was held to be bad
under search incident theory but nonetheless good under CarrollDoctrine
analysis.
D.

Good Search Incident But Bad CarrollDoctrine

The final of the four possibilities-a warrantless search inside an automobile good as an incident of lawful arrest but bad under the Carroll
Doctrine-is illustrated by the case of Howell v. State.'0 A breaking and
entering and an assault were perpetrated by Howell on May 16, 1972.
Although he made a clean getaway, the victim picked out his photograph.
A lookout for the appellant and his automobile, including a description of
the car and its license tag number, was broadcast via police teletype. Three
days later, at approximately 1 p.m. on May 19, the appellant was arrested
in his automobile on the parking lot of a drive-in restaurant. A warrantless
probe into the car produced from beneath the right front seat a bag of
marijuana. The issue before the court was the constitutionality of that
warrantless search and seizure. The court determined initially that the
search could not be justified under the CarrollDoctrine. Although exigency
may have been present, probable cause was not:
In many cases where a motorist is arrested and his car is searched, a
search incidental to a lawful arrest under Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969), and a search pursuant to the
"automobile exception" under Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 45
S.Ct. 280, 69 L.Ed. 543 (1925), may overlap. They do not, however, necessarily overlap. A search may at times be good upon both theories, at times
good upon either one of the theories but not upon the other, and at times
good upon neither theory. In the case at bar, the search of the automobile
cannot be predicated upon the "automobile exception" because of the
failure of Corporal Raymon to establish probable cause to believe that the
automobile contained evidence of crime, one of the two necessary preconditions for the invocation of this exception to the basic proposition that
all searches carried out without a warrant are per se unreasonable. Carroll
v. United States .. . Chambers v. Maroney . .. Coolidge v. New
Hampshire .... "I
139.

399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). See text accompanying notes 69-

79 supra.

140.

18 Md.App. 429, 306 A.2d 554 (1973). The decision in this case was reversed by

Howell v. State, 271 Md. 378, 318 A.2d 189 (1974), on factual grounds, but not disturbed was
the frame of analysis, which held that there could be a good "search incident" inside an
automobile even though a search of the automobile would not be permitted under the Carroll
Doctrine. The court of appeals, in reversing the decision, held that the record was factually
too skimpy to permit a determination of precisely where Howell was standing in relation to
his car door when he was arrested and of whether that door and/or its window were open or
closed.
141. 18 Md.App. at 431-32, 306 A.2d at 557. (citations omitted).
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Again with a change of paragraph signaling the shifting of gears of analysis, the court turned its attention to the "search incident" exception and
found (1) that there was a lawful underlying arrest and (2) that the search
was sufficiently contemporaneous therewith not to run afoul of Preston"'
in that regard:
If the search here is to be found legitimate, it must be as a valid search
incident to a lawful arrest under Chimel.

. .

. [T]he appellant was for-

mally arrested by Corporal Raymon moments after the corporal arrived
upon the scene. There is no question but that the search was sufficiently
contemporaneous with the arrest to satisfy the strictures of Preston v.
United States.

... 143

The critical question dealt with the permissible scope-the range in
space or the perimeter-of the admittedly proper "search incident." The
court held that the place of search fell within that perimeter: ,
In the case at bar, the arrestee, not yet thoroughly searched, was standing, unshackled, by the door of his automobile. His female companion,
who was also arrested, was seated upon the right front seat. The area
beneath the right front seat, from which the marihuana was recovered,
was, we hold, within the legitimate search perimeter emanating from the
appellant. Peterson v. State . .

.

.It was within the range from which a

weapon could easily have been recovered to endanger the officer or to
make good an escape. It was within the range from which readily destructible evidence could easily have been grabbed and destroyed. It was a
proper "search incident" to a lawful arrest. There was, therefore, no constitutional impediment to the introduction into evidence of the seized
marihuana.'
There is no Supreme Court decision involving the overlapping of the
theories wherein a warrantless search was held to be good under "search
incident" analysis but bad under the Carroll Doctrine.
Let the sermon be once more repeated. In dealing with the overlapping
of one or more doctrines, we must keep the analysis clean-we must keep
the compartments of thought watertight.
III. WHEN THE CARROLL DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY:
SOME SEARCHES OF AUTOMOBILES THAT Do NOT INVOLVE
THE "AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION"
A.

"Search Incident" Inside a Vehicle

A number of Supreme Court cases have dealt with warrantless searches
inside an automobile, the legitimacy of which rose or fell according to
analysis under the "search incident" exception to the warrant require142.
143.
144.

Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964).
18 Md.App. at 432, 306 A.2d at 557 (citations omitted).
Id. at 434, 306 A.2d at 558 (citation omitted).
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ment. The merely coincidental and purely peripheral fact that an automobile happened to be the locus of the "search incident to lawful arrest" did
not transform the warrantless search into one that called for analysis under
the Carroll Doctrine. A thoughtful reading of the Supreme Court cases
should make this apparent.
1. Preston v. United States
Preston v. United States' was preeminently a "search incident" case.
It was, indeed, the harbinger for the more fully articulated ultimate
"search incident" doctrine that would appear five years later in Chimel v.
California.4 ' In Preston, three men were arrested in their automobile at
shortly after 3 a.m. in the small town of Newport, Kentucky, after local
police had received a complaint that they had been parked in their car in
a business district since 10 o'clock the evening before. When the police
arrived to investigate further, the three men gave unsatisfactory, evasive
answers as to why they were there, why they could not produce any title
for the automobile and why they had only 25 cents among them. They were
arrested for vagrancy and were carried to the local police headquarters.'"7
One of the officers drove the car in which the suspects had been parked
to the police station. It was subsequently towed to a garage. After the three
men had been booked for vagrancy, several of the officers went to the
garage, searched the car and found two loaded revolvers in the glove compartment. They were not able to open the trunk, and they returned to the
station. A detective ordered them to go back and make a further effort to
get into the trunk. They did so and effected entry through the back seat
of the car. They recovered from the trunk caps, stocking masks, an illegally
manufactured snap-on license place, rope and pillow slips. Confronted
with this physical evidence, one of the three confessed that he and his
companions had been planning to rob a bank in a town 51 miles away. The
local police turned the evidence and the information over to the F.B.I.
Preston was convicted in federal court for conspiracy to rob a federally
insured bank. 4 '
After the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit had affirmed the conviction, certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court. The
issue there was the legitimacy of the warrantless search of the automobile.
In holding that the warrantless search was bad, Justice Black wrote for
a unanimous court. He was not totally innocent of a tendency to "scramble
the eggs" of analysis, but the scrambling was minimal and the character
of the opinion as an exclusively "search incident" opinion is unobscured.
Several references to Carroll were clearly introductory in nature and did
145.
146.
147.
148.

376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964).
395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969).
376 U.S. at 365, 84 S.Ct. at 882, 11 L.Ed.2d at 779.
Id. at 364-66, 84 S.Ct. at 882, 11 L.Ed.2d at 779.
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not transform the case remotely into one calling for analysis under the
Carroll Doctrine.
Before proceeding to analyze the warrantless search under the merits of
the fourth amendment, Justice Black, in a clearly introductory paragraph,
disposed briefly and preliminarily of two threshold questions. Because the
search had been effected by local rather than federal officials, it was necessary for him to point out that the search, under Elkins v. United States,"'
would nonetheless be judged by federal standards. He then went on, in the
same preliminary paragraph, to point out:
Our cases make it clear that searches of motorcars must meet the test of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment before evidence obtained as
a result of such searches is admissible. E. g., Carroll v. United
States. .. .. 150
The unmistakable import of that sentence is simply that an automobile is
a constitutionally protected area. It would, therefore, not be possible to
avoid the merits of the fourth amendment question by treating the warrantless search inside the automobile as the equivalent of the "open fields
doctrine"-as an instance of the fourth amendment inapplicable.
The purely gratuitous sentence that followed was a correct statement of
the law but was an irrelevant observation in the Preston case, since an
application of "search incident" law would be "identical" in cases of "motorcars" and "fixed structures" alike:
Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches of
motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be treated as identical to
questions arising out of searches of fixed structures like houses. For this
reason, what may be an unreasonable search of a house may be reasonable
in the case of a motorcar. See Carroll v. United States . ... 15
Since the Supreme Court was still groping its way toward Chimel, however, one cannot take it too harshly to task for not culling out an unnecessary sentence.
The opinion promptly got back on the track and concluded its introductory paragraph by making it clear that a search inside a motorcar would
be judged according to the merits of the fourth amendment and that the
analysis must proceed to see if any of the exceptions to the warrant requirement had been satisfied:
But even in the case of motorcars, the test still is, was the search unreasonable. Therefore we must inquire whether the facts of this case are such as
rule that a search
to fall within any of the exceptions to the constitutional
152
warrant must be had before a search may be made.
149. 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).
150. 376 U.S. at 366, 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 780 (citation omitted).
151.
152.

Id. at 366-67, 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 780 (citation omitted).
Id. at 367, 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 780.
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Any reference to Carrolland Brinegar up to that point was simply for the
purpose of pointing out that an automobile was a constitutionally protected area and called for further consideration under the merits of the
fourth amendment. It was not an analysis under the Carroll Doctrine exception to the warrant requirement.
The analysis that followed those preliminary observations was indisputably a "search incident" analysis and a "search incident" analysis alone:
the search and seizure was justified as incidental to a
"It is argued that
53
lawful arrest.'
The rest of the opinion proceeded to analyze the warrantless search in
Preston under the rationale which might justify a search incidental to
lawful arrest. In summarizing "search incident" law, the Court pointed out
that the police have the right to make a warrantless "search incident" of
the person of the arrestee, citing Weeks' 4 and Agnello. 55 It continued the
summary by pointing out that the right to make the warrantless "search
incident" extended "to things under the accused's immediate control,"'"
citing the dictum in Carroll that dealt with "search incident" law and not
that part of Carrollwhich established the CarrollDoctrine.5 7 The Preston
summary of antecedent "search incident" law concluded by making reference "to the place where he is arrested,"' 58 citing Agnello again, Marron'"
and Rabinowitz.6 " The analysis went on to point out that the
rule allowing contemporaneous searches is justified, for example, by the
need to seize weapons and other things which might be used to assault an
officer or effect an escape, as well as by the need to prevent the destruction
of evidence of the crime-things which might easily happen where the
weapon or evidence is on the accused's person or under his immediate
control.'6 '
Moving closer to the situation immediately before it, the opinion then
pointed out, by way of contrast, that "these justifications are absent where
a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once an accused is
under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another place, without
a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest."'' 2
For half a sentence, Justice Black seems ready to wander from the strict
"search incident" track:
153. Id.
154. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392, 34 S.Ct. 341, 344, 58 L.Ed. 652, 655 (1914).
155. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30, 46 S.Ct. 4, 5, 70 L.Ed. 145, 148 (1925).
156. 376 U.S. at 367, 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 780.
157. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 158, 45 S.Ct. at 287, 69 L.Ed. at 553.
158. 376 U.S. at 367, 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 780.
159. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 199, 48 S.Ct. 74, 77, 82 L.Ed. 231, 238 (1927).
160. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 61-62, 70 S.Ct. 430, 433, 94 L.Ed. 653, 65758 (1950).
161. 376 U.S. at 367, 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 780.
162. Id., 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 780-81.
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Here, we may assume, as the Government urges, that, either because the
arrests were valid or because the police had probable cause to think the
car stolen, the police had the right to search the car when they first came
on the scene. 63
The analysis that followed, however, reverted strictly to "search incident" guidelines, demonstrating that the arrestees were no longer in a
position either to grab weapons from the car or to destroy evidence contained in the car:
But this does not decide the question of the reasonableness of a search at
a later time and at another place. . . . The search of the car was not
undertaken until petitioner and his companions had been arrested and
taken in custody to the police station and the car had been towed to the
garage. At this point there was no danger that any of the men arrested
could have used any weapons in the car or could have destroyed any
evidence of a crime-assuming that there are articles which can be the
"fruits" or "implements" of the crime of vagrancy. . . . Nor, since the
men were under arrest at the police station and the car was in police
custody at a garage, was there any danger that the car would be moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction ...
.
The conclusion and holding of Preston left no room for doubt that the
only exception to the warrant requirement analyzed by it was that of a
"search incident to lawful arrest":
We think that the search was too remote in time or place to have been
made as incidental to the arrest and conclude, therefore, that the search
of the car without a warrant failed to meet the test of reasonableness under
the Fourth Amendment, rendering the evidence obtained as a result of the
6 5
search inadmissible.
If an internal examination of Preston itself left any room for doubt, the
later interpretations and characterizations of Preston by the Supreme
Court removed that doubt. If the uncritical half sentence of Justice Black
left room for anyone to believe that Preston was dealing alternatively with
a warrantless seizure of the car based upon probable cause to believe that
it was stolen,' 6 Justice Black himself dispelled any such notion in his
majority opinion for the Court in Cooper v. California 7 three years later.
He there pointed out that no such authority had been claimed by the police
and that no arrest for theft had been made, making it unnecessary to
analyze the warrantless seizure upon those grounds:
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 367-68, 84 S.Ct. at 883, 11 L.Ed.2d at 781 (emphasis supplied).
Id. at 368, 84 S.Ct. at 883-84, 11 L.Ed.2d at 781 (citations omitted).
Id., 84 S.Ct. at 884, 11 L.Ed.2d at 781 (emphasis supplied).
See text at note 163 supra.
386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
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In the Preston case, it was alternatively argued that the warrantless
search, after the arrest was over and while Preston's car was being held
for him by the police, was justified because the officers had probable cause
to believe the car was stolen. But the police arrested Preston for vagrancy,
not theft, and no claim was made that the police had authority to hold
his car on that charge. The search was therefore to be treated as though
his car was in his own or his agent's possession, safe from intrusions by
the police or anyone else.'
Justice Black reiterated that the search in Preston "was sought to be
justified primarily on the ground that it was incidental to and part of a
lawful arrest."' 6 9
Chambers v. Maroney' ° cited Preston as controlling authority for that
part of the Chambers opinion analyzing "search incident" law and concluding that it would not serve to justify the warrantless automobile search
in that case.'' In moving on to its analysis under the Carroll Doctrine,
Chambers pointed out that the automobile search in Preston could never
have been legitimated under that doctrine because of the lack of probable
cause. "In Preston, . . . the arrest was for vagrancy; it was apparent that
the officers had no cause to believe that evidence of crime was concealed
in the auto."'
In Coolidge v. New Hampshire,13 Preston is again cited as controlling
authority' in Part IIA of the opinion,' 5 dealing with the analysis of the
warrantless automobile search under "search incident" law. When the
Coolidge opinion moves on, however, in Part UB thereof,' to a distinct
analysis of the same warrantless automobile search under the Carroll Doctrine, the very thorough exposition of that doctrine makes no mention
whatsoever of Preston.
In Cady v. Dombrowski,"' the majority opinion, written by Justice
Rehnquist, distinguished Preston. It could not have been more emphatic
in characterizing Preston as a "search incident" case and nothing but a
''search incident" case:
In that case the respondent attempted to justify the warrantless search of
the trunk and seizure of the items therein "as incidental to a lawful arrest."... The Court rejected the asserted "search incident" justification
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 59-60, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732.
Id. at 59, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732.
399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).
Id. at 47, 90 S.Ct. at 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d at 426. See text accompanying note 71 supra.
Id.
403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
Id. at 457, 91 S.Ct. at 2033, 29 L.Ed.2d at 577-78.
Id. at 455-457, 91 S.Ct. at 2032-33, 29 L.Ed.2d at 576-77.
Id. at 458-64, 91 S.Ct. at 2033-37, 29 L.Ed.2d at 578-81.
413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
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for the warrantless search in the following terms: "But these justifications
are absent where a search is remote in time or place from the arrest. Once
an accused is under arrest and in custody, then a search made at another
place, without a warrant, is simply not incident to the arrest.". . . It
would be possible to interpret Preston broadly, and to argue that it stands
for the proposition that on those facts there could have been no constitutional justification advanced for the search. But we take the opinion as
written, and hold that it stands only for the proposition that the search
8
challenged there could not be justified as one incident to an arrest11
2.

Henry and Rios

Even prior to the Court's opinion in Preston, it had dealt in Henry v.
7
United States"'
and Rios v. United States'0 with warrantless searches of
automobiles under an exclusively "search incident" analysis.
In Henry, a warrantless search of Henry's automobile produced three
cartons of stolen radios,'"' which led to his conviction for the unlawful
possession of goods stolen from an interstate shipment.' 2 Justice Douglas,
writing for six members of the Court, framed the question before the Court
squarely: "The issue in the case is whether there was probable cause for
the arrest leading to the search that produced the evidence on which the
conviction rests."'" All of the subsequent analysis dealt with the legality
of the underlying arrest. After disposing of the case on those grounds alone,
only a parting comment alluded to the Carroll Doctrine, pointing out in
passing that the lack of probable cause which was fatal to the arrest would
also have been fatal to an analysis under the CarrollDoctrine:
The fact that the suspects were in an automobile is not enough. Carroll
v. United States. . .liberalized the rule governing searches when a moving vehicle is involved. But that decision merely relaxed the requirements
for a warrant on grounds of practicality. It did not dispense with the need
for probable cause.'""
In Rios v. United States,' 5 the defendant was convicted of "unlawful
receipt and concealment of narcotics.""'8 A warrantless search of the taxicab in which Rios was riding produced the package of heroin which formed
the basis for the charge. The main thrust of the Rios opinion, in conjunc178.
plied).
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id. at 444, 93 S.Ct. at 2529-30, 37 L.Ed.2d at 716 (citation omitted, emphasis sup,
361 U.S. 98, 80 S.Ct. 168, 4 L.Ed.2d 134 (1959).
364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960).
361 U.S. at 99-100, 80 S.Ct. at 169, 4 L.Ed.2d at 136-37.
Id. at 98, 80 S.Ct. at 169, 4 L.Ed.2d at 136.
Id.
Id. at 104, 80 S.Ct. at 172, 4 L.Ed.2d at 140.
364 U.S. 253, 80 S.Ct. 1431, 4 L.Ed.2d 1688 (1960).
Id. at 254, 80 S.Ct. at 1433, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1690.
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tion with its companion case of Elkins v. United States,8 ' was a constitutional rejection of the "silver platter doctrine." 8 ' The district court which
had convicted Rios had relied primarily upon the "silver platter doctrine"
and only secondarily upon a finding that Rios had been lawfully arrested
prior to the recovery of the heroin from the taxicab. The U.S. Court of
Appeals, affirming the conviction in the district court, gave no consideration to the question of the legality of the state's search and seizure and
relied exclusively upon the continuing vitality of the "silver platter doctrine." In remanding the case for a fuller consideration of the legality of
the arrest, the Supreme Court made it clear that the issue was the time
when the arrest occurred. If the arrest took place before the heroin was
spotted, both the arrest and its search incident were bad:
Here justification is primarily sought upon the claim that the search was
an incident to a lawful arrest. Yet upon no possible view of the circumstances revealed in the testimony of the Los Angeles officers could it be
said that there existed probable cause for an arrest at the time the officers
decided to alight from their car and approach the taxi in which the petitioner was riding. . . .This the Government concedes.
If, therefore, the arrest occurred when the officers took their positions
at the doors of the taxicab, then nothing that happened thereafter could
9
make that arrest lawful, or justify a search as its incident."
If, on the other hand, Rios had voluntarily revealed the packet of heroin
to the officers as they approached the taxicab for purposes of a routine
9 0
interrogation, the subsequent arrest would have been constitutional. In
either event, the analysis clearly proceeded under "search incident" law.
The Carroll Doctrine was not remotely involved, notwithstanding the fact
that the heroin was found by the police inside a taxicab which was stopped
by them upon the street.
3.

Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.

In Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co.,"' Dyke and his two companions
were found guilty of criminal contempt. A labor dispute in McMinn
County, Tennessee, had led to the issuance of an injunction which prohibited the inflicting of harm upon or the damaging of the persons or property
187. 364 U.S. 206, 80 S.Ct. 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d 1669 (1960).
188. Under the "silver platter doctrine," the fourth amendment was not offended when
agents of state governments, rather than federal agents, violated a defendant's fourth amendment rights, and the fruits of that search and seizure were turned over to federal authorities
for prosecution in a federal court. The doctrine had held that the evidence would not be
excluded in the federal trial so long as federal agents themselves had not violated the Constitution.
189. 364 U.S. at 261-62, 80 S.Ct. at 1436, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1693-94 (citations omitted).
190. Id. at 262, 80 S.Ct. at 1437, 4 L.Ed.2d at 1694.
191. 391 U.S. 216, 88 S.Ct. 1472, 20 L.Ed.2d 538 (1968).
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of the Taylor Implement Manufacturing Co. or its employees, customers
or visitors. After one of the non-striking employees of that company was
fired upon on the night of February 25, 1966, suspicion centered upon Dyke
and his two companions and the Dodge automobile in which they were
driving. Shortly after the shooting occurred in adjacent Monroe County, a
police radio alert went out for the car. After a high-speed chase, the car
was stopped near Athens, Tennessee. Its three occupants were arrested.
Their car was parked outside the jail while they were being processed on
the inside. The police searched the car without a warrant and found an air
rifle under the front seat. At ultimate issue was the constitutionality of this
warrantless search and seizure.
In finding the search and seizure to have been unconstitutional, the
Supreme Court applied sequentially an analysis under "search incident"
law and then, distinctly and independently, analysis under the Carroll
Doctrine. Relying upon Preston (Chimel was still a year in the future), the
Supreme Court held that the search was not good as an incident of arrest,
even assuming the arrests to have been lawful:
While the record is not entirely clear, petitioners appear to have been
arrested for reckless driving. Whether or not a car may constitutionally
be searched "incident" to arrest for a traffic offense, the search here did
not take place until petitioners were in custody inside the courthouse and
the car was parked on the street outside. Preston v. United States... "
The Supreme Court, to be sure, then did go on to look at the same
warrantless automobile search under an alternative analysis according to
the Carroll Doctrine. That the two analyses are distinct, however, is not
to be denied. The critical question under the "search incident" analysis
was the distance between the arrestees and their automobile and the time
that had transpired since they had left the automobile. The warrantless
search was also held to be unconstitutional under the CarrollDoctrine, but
for the very different reason there that there was no probable cause to
believe that the automobile contained evidence of crime. 9 3
4.

Lee and Chambers

Although United States v. Lee'94 and Chambers v. Maroney'95 were primarily CarrollDoctrine cases, they both analyzed their warrantless vehicular searches, alternatively, under "search incident" law. In Lee, the warrantless search of the motorboat was held to have been as a search incident
192. Id. at 220, 88 S.Ct. at 1475, 20 L.Ed.2d at 543 (citation omitted).
193. Id. at 221-22, 88 S.Ct. at 1475-76, 20 L.Ed.2d at 543-44.
194. 274 U.S. 559, 47 S.Ct. 746, 71 L.Ed. 1202 (1927). See text accompanying notes 39-43
supra.
195. 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970). See text accompanying notes 6979 supra.
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to a lawful arrest.'96 In Chambers, on the other hand, the warrantless
search of the automobile, albeit good under the Carroll Doctrine,9 7 was
held to have been bad under "search incident" law.9 s
5.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire, Part IIA

Coolidge v. New Hampshire'99 is the outstanding example of how analyses under separate exceptions to the warrant requirement can be kept in
watertight compartments. Part IIA 2w of that opinion analyzes the warrantless search of Coolidge's Pontiac and finds it to be wanting under preChimel "search incident" analysis. It relies primarily on Prestont1 and
considers the critical factors to be the lack of geographic proximity between Coolidge and his Pontiac at the time of its search and the lack of
contemporaneity between the time of arrest and the time of search. Part
IIB202 goes on, independently, to analyze the same warrantless search of the
same automobile according to Carroll Doctrine criteria-the element
found wanting being that of exigency. Part

IIC203

of the opinion then goes

on, independently, and analyzes the same search of the same automobile
under the Plain View Doctrine exception to the warrant requirement. It is
again found wanting, but this time essentially because of the lack of inadvertence.
B.

Hot PursuitInside a Vehicle

The second of the recognized exceptions to the warrant requirement, in
terms of seniority, is, of course, the CarrollDoctrine itself. We shall, therefore, move on to the third oldest of the exceptions. This is the exception
created in 1967 by the Supreme Court's decision of Warden v. Hayden.20
The Supreme Court has been inclined to call this the "hot pursuit" exception. The academic community has recognized that it may have broader
implications and has generally labeled it the "emergency circumstances"
exception, hot pursuit simply being one instance of emergency circumstances.20° The thrust of the exception is that the threshold even of a fixed
196. 274 U.S. at 563, 47 S.Ct. at 748, 71 L.Ed. at 1204. See text accompanying note 42
supra.
197. See text accompanying notes 72-79 supra.
198. 399 U.S. at 47, 90 S.Ct. at 1979, 26 L.Ed.2d at 426. See text accompanying note 71
supra.
199. 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2027, 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971).
200. Id. at 455-57, 91 S.Ct. at 2032-33, 29 L.Ed.2d at 576-78.
201. Indeed, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 89 S.Ct. 2034, 23 L.Ed.2d 685 (1969),
itself relies heavily upon Preston, further enhancing Preston's credentials as a quintessentially "search incident" case.
202. 403 U.S. at 458-64, 91 S.Ct. at 2033-37, 29 L.Ed.2d at 578-81.
203. Id. at 464-73, 91 S.Ct. at 2037-42, 29 L.Ed.2d at 581-87.
204. 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d 782 (1967).
205. The broader implications had been examined by Chief Justice Burger when he was
sitting on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in the case of Wayne v.
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premises will yield to the exigency of saving or protecting life. Involved
may be the hot pursuit of an armed and dangerous felon, as in Warden v.
Hayden, who might well endanger the lives of the policemen themselves
or the lives of others if not promptly apprehended. Involved might be the
crossing of the threshold to put out a fire or save an occupant from the fire,
to quell a disturbance, to offer aid or to rush a stricken or bleeding occupant to the hospital. Warden v. Hayden is the first and last Supreme Court
decision to deal with this exception. It authorized the warrantless crossing
of the threshold of a fixed premises.
Although there has been no Supreme Court decision applying this exception to the warrantless crossing of the threshold-the running board-of a
vehicle, there can be no doubt that if even the greater threshold of a fixed
premises would yield to such benign or otherwise lifesaving purposes, a
fortiori the lesser threshold would also yield. Hypothesizing from the facts
of Warden v. Hayden alone, it cannot be doubted that if Bennie Joe Hayden had fled into a mobile home, into a large van, or into the bowels of a
seagoing vessel, the police would have been permitted to maintain their
"hot pursuit" into those constitutionally protected places just as surely as
they were permitted to maintain their "hot pursuit" into a row house.
Bennie Joe Hayden could not have obtained safe haven by jumping into
his automobile and shutting the door behind him.
It also follows ineluctably that the analysis of the crossing of such a
threshold would proceed according to the criteria of the "hot pursuit" or
"emergency circumstances" exception to the warrant requirement and not
according to the Carroll Doctrine.
C.

-"Stop

and Frisk" Inside a Vehicle

Terry v. Ohio206 and Sibron v. New York 27 carved out yet a fourth exception to the warrant requirement in 1968. They established initially that a
stop and a frisk, albeit lesser intrusions than their seizure and search
counterparts, were permissible under the fourth amendment. They went
on to establish that because the stop and the frisk were lesser intrusions
than their seizure and search counterparts, they would be constitutionally
permitted upon predicates less substantial than probable cause. They further established that a frisk is a search operating only under the limitation
that it be limited in its intensity and scope to that which is necessary to
20
detect the presence of dangerous weapons.
It is now firmly established by Adams v. Williams 2 9 and United States
United States, 318 F.2d 205 (D.C. Cir. 1963) and in an excellent article by Bacigal, The
Emergency Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 9 U. RICHMOND L. REV. 249 (1975).
206. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968).
207. 392 U.S. 40, 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 917 (1968).
208. For an analysis of the stop and frisk rationale, see Gibbs v. State, 18 Md. App. 230,
306 A.2d 587 (1973).
209. 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
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v. Brignoni-Ponce0 that a stop and an attendant frisk may be made of a
motorist or of an occupant of an automobile just as surely as it may be
made of a pedestrian."' Our focus for present purposes is upon the limitedscope search-the frisk-that intrudes into an automobile or automobile
equivalent.
A frisk and a "search incident" to lawful arrest share many characteristics. The "search incident" has two purposes-the detection and recovery
of weapons and the prevention of the destruction of evidence. The frisk
serves only the first of those two purposes. For that reason, the frisk may
not be as intensive in scope as the "search incident." A mere pat down of
the exterior of the clothing serves to detect the presence of weapons. A
"search incident" may be more intensive, going into pockets, wallets and
other hidden areas to detect destructible evidence. This greater intensity
is not permitted the frisk.
The frisk and the "search incident" enjoy the same scope in terms of how
extensive they may be, however. It is logically inevitable that the geographical range in space of a frisk must be the Chimel "search incident"
perimeter. The ability to reach, lunge or grasp for a weapon to harm an
arresting officer cannot be different than the ability to reach, lunge or
grasp for a weapon to harm a "stopping" officer. Depending upon the
position of a "stopped" suspect in or near an automobile, the frisk perimeter may intrude into none, into all or into some portion of that automobile
just as in the case of a "search incident" made in the same position.2 12 The
wingspread of the possibly dangerous suspect is not affected by the
distinction between his status as an arrestee and his status as a "stoppee."
The point, for present purposes, is that the coincidental presence of an
automobile as the locus of the frisk does not serve to transform the case
from one requiring analysis under the "stop and frisk" exception into one
calling for analysis under the Carroll Doctrine exception. Illustrative is the
case of Adams v.Williams. 2 1 In that case, an officer on routine patrol in
a high-crime district during early morning hours developed reasonable
grounds to suspect that Williams, then seated in his automobile, was
armed and was carrying narcotics. Although Sgt. Connolly did not have
sufficient probable cause to make an arrest, he had reasonable suspicion
to stop Williams and subject him to further interrogation and to frisk him
for weapons. Sgt. Connolly approached the car, tapped on the car window
and asked Williams to open the door. "When Williams rolled down the
window instead, the sergeant reached into the car and removed a fully
loaded revolver from Williams' waistband. The gun had not been visible

to Connolly from outside the car. ....
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

11

The recovery of the gun was held

422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975).
In this regard see Williams v. State, 19 Md.App. 204, 310 A.2d 593 (1973).
See text accompanying note 118 supra.
407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 1921, 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972).
Id. at 145, 92 S.Ct. at 1922-23, 32 L.Ed.2d at 616.
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to be constitutional. Of present significance is the fact that the analysis
leading to that holding of constitutionality was exclusively a "stop and
frisk" analysis. The mere fact that the frisk intruded into an automobile
did not remotely invoke the Carroll Doctrine."'5
16
In United States v. Brignoni-Ponce,
a roving patrol of the U.S. Border
Patrol stopped the defendant's vehicle on a California highway at a point
not far north of the Mexican border. Observed in the car were the defendant and two passengers, all of whom were apparently of Mexican descent.
The questioning of the three occupants of the automobile developed that
the two passengers were in the act of entering the country unlawfully.
Brignoni-Ponce was convicted "of knowingly transporting illegal immigrants. '"217 The point for present purposes is that the constitutional analysis by Justice Powell, for a majority of the Court, of the stopping of the
vehicle and the observation of the persons inside the vehicle was made in
the analytical context of the "stop and frisk" exception. Although holding
that the Border Patrol had in this case no reasonable and articulable
suspicion for the stop, the opinion held that where such articulable suspicion is present, under the guidelines of Terry v. Ohio, a warrantless stop
of a motorist or of a passenger in an automobile may be effected.," Since
Terry is the applicable bench mark, it would follow that a frisk, based upon
appropriately articulable suspicion, could attend such a stop and could
intrude into the automobile if the stoppee was in or up against the automobile at the moment when the officer reasonably apprehended that such
stoppee might be armed. Once again, the mere coincidental involvement
of an automobile did not thrust the constitutional analysis into a Carroll
Doctrine mode.
D.

Border Searches Inside a Vehicle

Before proceeding onto the next of the well-recognized exceptions to the
warrant requirement, it is appropriate at this juncture to point out that a
number of the "border search" cases have involved searches of automobiles. Among them are United States v. Peltier,"9 United States v. Ortiz,220
Bowen v. United States,22t as well as the primary thrust of Almeida215. The recovery of the loaded revolver established probable cause for the arrest of
Williams. Williams was ordered out of his automobile. An immediate search of the automobile revealed substantial quantities of heroin in the car. This search and seizure also was held
to have been constitutional. This analysis also eschewed reliance upon the Carroll Doctrine
and proceeded under "search incident" criteria. The Supreme Court found that since the
arrest was good, "the search of his person and of the car incident to that arrest was lawful."
Id. at 149, 92 S.Ct. at 1925, 32 L.Ed.2d at 612.
216. 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d at 607 (1975).
217. Id. at 875, 95 S.Ct. at 2577, 45 L.Ed.2d at 613.
218. Id. at 878-87, 95 S.Ct. at 2578-83, 45 L.Ed.2d at 614-20.
219. 422 U.S. 531, 95 S.Ct. 2313, 45 L.Ed.2d 374 (1975).
220. 422 U.S. 891, 95 S.Ct. 2585, 45 L.Ed.2d 623 (1975).
221. 422 U.S. 916, 95 S.Ct. 2569, 45 L.Ed.2d 641 (1975).
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Sanchez v. United States." Again, the point is that, notwithstanding that
an automobile was the subject of the warrantless search, the analysis has
proceeded strictly according to the criteria governing border searches and
22 3
has not been crammed into a distended Carroll Doctrine.
E. Forfeitures of Vehicles
Before returning to the running of the catalogue of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement, one further tangent may be conveniently disposed of
at this point. Where automobiles have been warrantlessly seized and made
subject to forfeiture because of their involvement in the traffic in contraband liquor, the analysis of the merits and demerits of those cases has
proceeded within its own constitutional framework and has not obtruded
into analysis under the Carroll Doctrine. Among such cases are One 1958
Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,224 United States v. One Ford Coupe
22 61
Automobile"' and Dodge v. United States.
F.

The Plain View Doctrine Inside a Vehicle

In at least four Supreme Court decisions, warrantless searches or seizures from automobiles have explicitly or implicitly been analyzed under
the Plain View Doctrine exception to the warrant requirement rather than
under the Carroll Doctrine. In two of these, Harris v. United States227 and
Coolidge v. New Hampshire (Part IIC), 22 the analysis is commendably
clean. In the other two cases, Cooper v. California229 and Cady v.
Dombrowski,23 the distinctions were not made as crisply as they might
have been, but the identification of the genus is unmistakable from the
telltale characteristics of the significant constitutional criteria.
1.

Harris v. United States

James H. Harris was convicted in the District of Columbia of robbery.
A critical piece of incriminating evidence was an automobile registration
card belonging to the robbery victim. The card was taken warrantlessly
from Harris's automobile. The trial court ruled that the warrantless seizure
222. 413 U.S. 266, 93 S.Ct. 2535, 37 L.Ed.2d 596 (1973). See text accompanying notes 97100 supra.
223. For an excellent survey of this entire category of cases, see Comment, AlmeidaSanchez and Its Progeny: The Developing Border Zone Search Law, 17 AMlz. L. REV. 214
(1975).
224. 380 U.S. 693, 85 S.Ct. 1246, 14 L.Ed.2d 170 (1965).
225. 272 U.S. 321, 47 S.Ct. 154, 71 L.Ed. 279 (1926).
226. 272 U.S. 530, 47 S.Ct. 191, 71 L.Ed. 392 (1926).
227. 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).
228. 403 U.S. at 464-73, 91 S.Ct. at 2037-42, 29 L.Ed.2d at 581-87.
229. 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
230. 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
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was constitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals reversed, ruling that the
seizure was unlawful. The critical issue before the Supreme Court was the
validity of that warrantless seizure.
Harris's automobile had been observed leaving the scene of the robbery.
Its ownership was traced and Harris was arrested as he was entering the
car near his home. He was taken to the police station. The car was impounded as evidence and was towed to the police parking lot. When it
arrived at the police lot approximately one hour and 15 minutes after
Harris had arrived at the police station, its windows were open and its
doors were unlocked. It had begun to rain. Under a regulation of the Metropolitan Police Department, officers are required to inventory an impounded vehicle, to remove all valuables from it and to place a property
tag on it. An officer had already placed a tag on the steering wheel and
was in the act of rolling up the windows against the rain, when he moved
to the front door on the passenger's side. As he opened that door preparatory to rolling up the window, he saw the registration card in question lying
face up on the metal stripping over which the door closes."' He seized the
card.
The Supreme Court held that the seizure was good. Its analysis is significant:
The sole question for our consideration is whether the officer discovered
the registration card by means of an illegal search. We hold that he did
not. The admissibility of evidence found as a result of a search under the
police regulation is not presented by this case. The precise and detailed
findings of the District Court, accepted by the Court of Appeals, were to
the effect that the discovery of the card was not the result of a search of
the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police
custody. Nothing in the Fourth Amendment requires the police to obtain
a warrant in these narrow circumstances.
Once the door had lawfully been opened, the registration card, with the
name of the robbery victim on it, was plainly visible. It has long been
settled that objects falling in the plain view of an officer who has a right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be
introduced in evidence.n2
The admirable thing about the Harris opinion is that it made no effort to
squeeze its rationale into some bloated version of the Carroll Doctrine. It
was the harbinger which announced the coming of the Plain View Doctrine
three years hence in Coolidge. Under the guidelines that would be more
fully articulated at that time, it was a classic Plain View Doctrine case.
The perfectly proper opening of the right front car door for the benign
purpose of rolling up the window against the rain was a prior valid intru231.
232.

390 U.S. at 235-36, 88 S.Ct. at 993, 19 L.Ed.2d at 1069.
Id. at 236, 88 S.Ct. at 993, 19 L.Ed.2d at 1069.
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sion. When probable evidence of crime was then inadvertently spotted in
plain view, it was seizable warrantlessly under the Plain View Doctrine.
2.

Coolidge v. New Hampshire,Part IIC

Part IIC of Coolidge was, by definition, an analysis exclusively under the
Plain View Doctrine which it was fully articulating for the first time. All
analysis of the warrantless search of Coolidge's Pontiac under "search
incident" law had been neatly confined to Part IIA of the opinion.2 1 Similarly, all analysis of the same warrantless search under Carroll Doctrine
law had been scrupulously isolated within Part IIB of the opinion. 23 The
warrantless seizure of the Pontiac was not upheld under the Plain View
Doctrine because of its failure to satisfy the inadvertence requirement. The
significance of the case for present purposes, however, is that the Plain
View Doctrine phase of the analysis was kept absolutely watertight from
all other possible analyses.
3.

Cooper v. California

Cooper v. California2' is an unsatisfactory opinion. The Court was split
5 to 4. Justice Black, writing for the majority, disposed of the case in a bare
four pages. (The Justice, so sharp and incisive in so many other areas, was
generally unsatisfactory in handling the fourth amendment because of the
undifferentiated character of his analytical approach.)
Cooper did not come to the Supreme Court as a search and seizure case.
The California District Court of Appeal had held that the search was bad
but that the error was, in any event, harmless.231 The California Supreme
23
Court declined to hear the case. The Supreme Court granted certiorari
238
in this case along with Chapman v. California to consider the question
of harmless error where a constitutional provision had been violated.
Chapman v. California became the vehicle for the Supreme Court's harmless error doctrine. It found it unnecessary to reach the question of harmless error in Cooper, however, because of its holding that the lower California court was wrong in ruling that the search and seizure violated the
32 9
fourth amendment.
Cooper is furthermore a bad vehicle for analyzing exceptions to the
warrant requirement because its holding was ultimately framed very
233. 403 U.S. 443, 455-57, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032-33, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 576-78 (1971). See text
accompanying notes 199-203 supra.
234. 403 U.S. at 458-64, 91 S.Ct. at 2033-37, 29 L.Ed.2d at 578-81. See text accompanying
notes 80-96 supra.
235. 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
236. People v. Cooper, 234 Cal.App.2d 587, 44 Cal.Rptr. 483 (1965).
237. 384 U.S. 904, 86 S.Ct. 1348, 16 L.Ed.2d 357 (1966).
238. 386 U.S. 18, 87 S.Ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967).
239. 386 U.S. at 59, 87 S.Ct. at 789, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732.

1038

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

squarely in terms of the now discredited Rabinowitz'" approach. It expressly eschewed analysis in terms of a search warrant as the norm with
exceptions thereto constitutionally permissible only upon a showing of
exceptional good cause:
It is no answer to say that the police could have obtained a search warrant,
for "[tihe relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." United States v.
Rabinowitz. . . .Under the circumstances of this case, we cannot hold
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment the examination or search of
a car validly held by officers for use as evidence in a forfeiture proceed24
ing. 1
Joe Nathan Cooper ultimately was convicted of selling heroin to a police
informer. The evidence seized from his automobile was peripheral in the
extreme. It was a small piece of a brown paper sack taken from the glove
compartment.2 2 It appeared to have been torn from a grocery bag. It
matched the brown paper in which the heroin had been wrapped, which
Cooper sold to an undercover police agent.24 3 At issue was the warrantless
search of the glove compartment which produced the scrap of brown paper.
At the time of Cooper's arrest, his automobile was seized and was towed
to a police garage. It was there being held under a California statute "
which provided that "any officer making an arrest for a narcotics violation
shall seize . . . any vehicle used to store, conceal, transport, sell or facilitate the possession of narcotics." 45 The vehicle was to be held as evidence
"until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered." 246 The automobile had been in police hands upon the police lot for one week when the
2 7
police searched it and found the incriminating scrap of paper.
The main thrust of Justice Black's opinion was the distinguishing of
Preston v. United States.2"s The California District Court of Appeal had
relied upon Preston in ruling the search unconstitutional. 2 ", Fully half of
Justice Black's analysis was devoted to showing that Preston was exclusively a "search incident" case and was not a broad authority controlling
every automobile search resembling Preston in surface characteristics.2 "0
240. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950).
241. 386 U.S. at 62, 87 S.Ct. at 791, 17 L.Ed.2d at 733-34 (citation omitted).
242. Id. at 58, 87 S.Ct. at 789, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732.
243. Id. at 63, 87 S.Ct. at 791-92, 17 L.Ed.2d at 734 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
244. CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11611.
245. 386 U.S. at 60, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 733.
246. Id.
247. Id. at 58, 87 S.Ct. at 789, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732.
248. 376 U.S. 364, 84 S.Ct. 881, 11 L.Ed.2d 777 (1964). See text accompanying notes 145178 supra.
249. 386 U.S. at 59, 87 S.Ct. at 789, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732.
250. Id. at 59-60, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732-33. See text accompanying notes 167169 supra.
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Indeed, the full thrust of Justice Douglas's dissenting opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Warren and Justices Brennan and Fortas, was to the effect
that Preston was controlling and that the search of Cooper's automobile
could not be legitimated as an incident of his arrest.2' After putting
Preston to rest as a controlling precedent, Justice Black indicated that the
analysis must proceed in another direction: "Here, California's Attorney
General concedes that the search was not incident to an arrest. It is argued,
'' 2
however, that the search was reasonable on other grounds. 1
In searching for other grounds, it is clear that Justice Black did not look
to the Carroll Doctrine. Neither Carroll nor any of its progeny-Husty,
Scher and Brinegar-areeven alluded to in the Cooper opinion. The
Carroll Doctrine is not there even by implication. Not one word is said
suggesting any exigency arising out of the mobility or likely disappearance
of Cooper's automobile. Not one word is said about any probable cause to
believe that the automobile contained evidence of crime. Neither element,
let alone both, necessary to a CarrollDoctrine warrantless search is even
arguably established. There is simply nothing in the Cooper opinion to
cause later commentators artificially to engraft it onto the Carroll Doctrine-unless, of course, the mere coincidental fact of an automobile as the
situs of the warrantless search destroys all capacity for analytical discrimination.
To place Cooper in a proper analytical context, two approaches are
possible. We may consign Cooper to the fog-shrouded and diffuse Limbo
of Rabinowitz2 53 and forget it. Alternatively, we may look for an explanation in later and more precisely defined case law. The explanation that
immediately commends itself is the superbly reasoned Plain View Doctrine
of Justice Stewart in Coolidge.54
What Cooper unmistakably suggests is not a search of the car as such
for incriminating evidence but rather a routine processing of the car because the police were required by law to maintain control of the vehicle
pending the forfeiture proceedings:
Here the officers seized petitioner's car because they were required to do
so by state law. . . .They seized it to impound it and they had to keep
it until forfeiture proceedings were concluded. . . . The forfeiture of petitioner's car did not take place until over four months after it was lawfully
seized. It would be unreasonable to hold that the police, having to retain
the car in their custody for such a length of time, had no right, even for
their own protection, to search it.251
251.

Id. at 62-65, 87 S.Ct. at 791-93, 17 L.Ed.2d at 734-36 (Douglas, J., dissenting).

252. Id. at 60, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 733.
253. United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 70 S.Ct. 430, 94 L.Ed. 653 (1950).
254. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2032-42, 29 L.Ed.2d
564, 581-87 (1971).
255. 386 U.S. at 61-62, 87 S.Ct. at 791, 17 L.Ed.2d at 733.
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If such a routine processing is mandated (or permitted) "for their own
protection" or otherwise, this is preeminently a prior valid intrusion, the
first of the necessary preconditions for a warrantless Plain View Doctrine
seizure. When, following that prior valid intrusion, probable evidence of
crime is inadvertently spotted in plain view, it is seizable.
There are intimations here, to be sure, of later inventory search rationale, but with limitations. The inventory "thing," which has had a tendency
in the hands of overzealous investigators to run amok, 56 is far more frequently than not a discretionary police tactic where the taking of custody
of a vehicle is not compelled by law. Far less drastic alternatives-having
a defendant park and lock his vehicle, having a friend or relative or attorney come and retrieve the vehicle, or having the defendant absolve the
policemen of all responsibility for his personal property-are generally
available, and the protective custody of the vehicle and subsequent inventorying of personal property contained therein smacks resoundingly of investigative opportunism with little more than a wink of the eye to a willingly gullible judiciary. In Cooper, by way of contrast, the police had no
alternative but to maintain custody of the vehicle pendente lite. In this
limited situation, an inventory may be constitutionally legitimate even if
its paler reflections under more discretionary circumstances are not. As
will be more fully articulated in the following section, however, an inventory search is, by definition, not a search for incriminating evidence but a
more innocuous processing and listing of personal property of any character (criminal or non-criminal) for the protection of the owner. The initial
intrusion into the otherwise constitutionally protected area made in its
name is valid. Condition number one of the Plain View Doctrine is satisfied. When probable evidence is then inadvertently spotted, it may be
seized.
The Cooper opinion manages to drag several red herrings across the
scent. Justice Black, in distinguishing Preston (which was already adequately distinguished on other grounds), pointed out:
They seized it because of the crime for which they arrested petitioner. . . . Their subsequent search of the car-whether the State had
"legal title" to it or not-was closely related to the reason petitioner was
arrested, the reason his car had been impounded, and the reason it was
being retained. 7
With due deference to Justice Black, one is prompted to say, "So what?"
If a vehicle is subject to seizure and subsequent forfeiture proceedings
because the police believe it to have been used in the narcotics traffic, do
256. See Moylan, The Inventory Search of an Automobile: A Willing Suspension of
Disbelief, 5 U. BALT. L. REV. 203 (1976). See also Dixon v. State, 23 Md.App. 19, 327 A.2d
516, (1974); Mozzetti v. Superior Court of Sacramento County, 4 Cal.3d 699, 94 Cal.Rptr.
412, 484 P.2d 84 (1971); Boulet v. State, 17 Ariz.App. 64, 495 P.2d 504 (1972).
257. 386 U.S. at 61, 87 S.Ct. at 791, 17 L.Ed.2d at 733.
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we care whether the driver was arrested for some unrelated charge such as
filing a false tax return or committing a statutory rape, whether the driver
was arrested at all, whether the driver was a totally innocent "fall guy"
and unsuspecting chauffeur, or whether the driver had successfully fled to
Brazil or Costa Rica? 58 The arrest vel non of anybody for anything simply
does not appear to be a crucial and necessary precondition to the in rem
forfeiture proceeding.
Some glossators have attached significance to the fact that the police
custody of the car was compelled by statute. Again, this factor appears to
be more descriptive than pivotal. If holding a car for forfeiture were unconstitutional, could a statute overrule the Constitution? If, on the other
hand, the proceeding is constitutional if statutory, would it be any less
constitutional if authorized by rule of court, by state judicial interpretation
of the common law, by some administrative policy or by standing local
tradition? Indeed, Justice Black denigrated the significance of the statute
as such, which, as authoritatively construed by the state court, did not
authorize the subsequent search even though it did authorize the initial
seizure:
The lower court concluded, as a matter of state law, that the state forfeiture statute did not by "clear and express language" authorize the officers
to search petitioner's car. . . But the question here is not whether the
search was authorized by state law. The question is rather whether the
search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Just as a search
authorized by state law may be an unreasonable one under that amendment, so may a search not expressly authorized
by state law be justified
255
as a constitutionally reasonable one.

When all is said and done, a valid initial intrusion was made for a
purpose other than looking for incriminating evidence as such. Although
not fully articulated as such in Cooper, the subsequent warrantless seizure
of the piece of brown paper would be legitimate within the contemplation
of the Plain View Doctrine. At least by such a construction, the case fits
258. CALIF. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE § 11610 does not seem to require an arrest as predicate:
The interest of any registered owner of a vehicle used to unlawfully transport or
facilitate the unlawful transportation of any narcotic, or in which any narcotic is
unlawfully kept, deposited, or concealed or which is used to facilitate the unlawful
keeping, depositing or concealment of any narcotic, or in which any narcotic is
unlawfully possessed by an occupant thereof or which is used to facilitate the
unlawful possession of any narcotic by an occupant thereof, shall be forfeited to the
State.
See 386 U.S. at 60, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 733, n. 1.
The "owner" who is subject to losing his "interest" may have had no knowledge of the
unlawful activities of the offending "occupant."
259. 386 U.S. at 60-61, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 733 (citation omitted, emphasis
supplied).
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into a well-ordered fourth amendment universe. There is no reason not to
strive at least for the "seamless web."0 Indeed, Cady v. Dombrowski
grouped Cooper analytically"" with Harris v. United States,6 2 a classic
Plain View Doctrine case.
What is clear is that Cooper is not a CarrollDoctrine case. In thoroughly
reviewing the Carroll Doctrine, Chambers v. Maroney63 cited Cooper only
for its characterization of Preston as a "search incident" case. 2 4 That part
(Part IIB) of the Coolidge opinion dealing with the Carroll Doctrine does
not cite or rely on Cooper in any way. It is mentioned only in a footnote
which points out that for Carroll Doctrine purposes, Cooper "is no more
2 5
in point here than in the context of a search incident to a lawful arrest."
When the Court in Part HC of Coolidge26 1 moves on to a consideration
of the Plain View Doctrine, however, Cooper does appear as a relevant
bench mark. In setting forth the State's argument, Justice Stewart points
out that the State initially urges that the seizure of Coolidge's Pontiac was
lawful. He then sets forth the next rung in the State's ladder of logic:
Supposing the seizure to be thus lawful, the case of Cooper v. California
is said to support a subsequent 27
warrantless search at the station
house, with or without probable cause.
Justice Stewart pointed out that since the State's predicate of a lawful
seizure of the automobile in the first instance was found wanting, the
examination of the next step under Cooper was unnecessary:
But, for the reasons that follow, we hold that the "plain view" exception
to the warrant requirement is inapplicable to this case. Since the seizure
was therefore illegal, it is unnecessary to consider the applicability of
266
Cooper, supra, to the subsequent search.
What emerges clearly is that Cooper was being considered within the context of the Plain View Doctrine.
260. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2527, 37 L.Ed.2d 706, 714
(1973): "[T]his branch of the law is something less than a seamless web."
261. Id. at 442 and 445, 93 S.Ct. at 2528 and 2530, 37 L.Ed.2d at 716 and 717.
262. 390 U.S. 234, 88 S.Ct. 992, 19 L.Ed.2d 1067 (1968).

263. 399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).
264.

Id. at 49-50, 90 S.Ct. at 1980, 26 L.Ed.2d at 427.

265. 403 U.S. at 464, 91 S.Ct. at 20.37, 29 L.Ed.2d at 581, n. 21. The footnote went on to
point out that the initial seizure of the automobile in Cooper was not questioned:
In Cooper, the seizure of the petitioner's car was mandated by California statute,
and its legality was not questioned. The case stands for the proposition that, given
an unquestionably legal seizure, there are special circumstances that may validate
a subsequent warrantless search. Cf. Chambers, supra. The case certainly should
not be read as holding that the police can do without a warrant at the police station
what they are forbidden to do without a warrant at the place of seizure.
266. Id. at 464-73, 91 S.Ct. at 2037-42, 29 L.Ed.2d at 551-87.
267. Id. at 464, 91 S.Ct. at 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d at 582 (citation omitted).
268. Id. at 464-65, 91 S.Ct. at 2037, 29 L.Ed.2d at 582.
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The four dissenting justices in Coolidge all would have affirmed the
warrantless search of Coolidge's Pontiac on the authority of Cooper. A close
reading makes it apparent, however, that the plurality opinion of Justice
0
Stewart in this regard"' and the dissenting opinion of Justice Black2
(concurred in on this point by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun)
and the dissenting opinion of Justice Whitezl (concurred in on this point
by the Chief Justice) differ not as to the applicability of Cooper to the
warrantless search of a vehicle already in police custody but rather over
the threshold question of the lawfulness of the initial seizure of the vehicle
itself. The quarrel is over the predicate which Cooper itself never had to
deal with.
The debate generated by Cooper is not over the warrantless Plain View
Doctrine seizure of probable evidence following a prior valid intrusion, but
with the validity of that prior valid intrusion itself. That intrusion, be it
valid or invalid, did not purport to rely upon the combination of probable
cause and exigency. As one commentator has lucidly pointed out:
The most sensible interpretation of Cooper is that the police may search
a car, with or without probable cause, if they have a continuing right to
possess it. . . .[T]he reference to self-protection does seem to indicate
that a search in furtherance of the police possessory interest, rather than
a probable cause search for evidence, was seen by the Court as the central
feature of the case. On that basis, it is hard to see what probable cause
would add to a possessory right in justifying the intrusion. Rather, Cooper,
in Justice Brennan's phrase, stands for the proposition that the police,
under a forfeiture statute,
are "authorized to treat the car in their custody
'2
as if it were their own.
Cooper is preeminently not a Carroll Doctrine case.
4. Automobile Inventory Searches
Leaving aside the very pertinent question of whether an unsolicited inventory "to protect a suspect's personalty" can ever be bona fide and not
an unconscionable sham, an inventory search is the antithesis of a Carroll
Doctrine search. The inventory search, by definition, is a mere listing of
personal property and not a deliberate search for evidence; a CarrollDoctrine search is a deliberate search for evidence. An inventory search is not
based upon probable cause-probable cause is, indeed, an irrelevant no269. Id.
270. Id. at 504-05, 91 S.Ct. at 2056-57, 29 L.Ed.2d at 605 (Black, J., concurring and
dissenting).
271. Id. at 522, 91 S.Ct. at 2065-66, 29 L.Ed.2d at 615-16 (White, J., concurring and
dissenting).
272. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARv. L. REv. 835, 84647 (1974), quoting from Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 453, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 2534, 37
L.Ed.2d 706, 721 (1973), (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tion; a Carroll Doctrine search must rest upon probable cause. The inventory search need not depend upon any exigency-indeed, the nonlikelihood that the owner's relatives or agents will call for the car ostensibly
heightens the need for the protective inventory; a Carroll Doctrine search
is absolutely dependent upon exigency. Once one gets beyond the surface
similarity that a policeman took a gander around the interior of the family
Chevrolet, the inventory search and the Carroll Doctrine search are
diametrically opposed in every doctrinal respect.
If an inventory search of an automobile is not a Carroll Doctrine search,
just what is it? Assuming for the moment that the making of an inventory
is a legitimate excuse for intruding into the constitutionally protected area
of a person's automobile, it is clear that the crossing of the threshold is a
prior valid intrusion within the contemplation of Coolidge, one of the necessary conditions to bring into play the Plain View Doctrine. If, following
the valid intrusion for this innocuous and non-investigative purpose, there
is then an inadvertent spotting of probable evidence in plain view, such
evidence is seizable under the Plain View Doctrine. Seizures in the course
of inventory searches must, therefore, be reviewed under a Plain View
Doctrine analysis.
5.

Cady v. Dombrowski

Implicitly if not explicitly, Cady v. Dombrowski2 13 is a Plain View Doctrine case and not a Carroll Doctrine case. The ultimate issue that split
the five-man majority274 from the four-man dissent 75 was the validity of a
warrantless intrusion into the trunk of an automobile which inadvertently
revealed probable evidence of crime in plain view. The intrusion in question was not made for the purpose of finding any evidence of crime.
The prime difficulty with the majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist is
that it wandered rather casually back and forth across the line between the
Carroll Doctrine and the Plain View Doctrine and tended, therefore, to
blur the distinction between the two. Indeed, CarrollDoctrine precedents
were invoked to demonstrate the reasonableness of the prior valid intrusion
even though that intrusion was not made for the purpose of discovering
evidence of crime, was not made upon probable cause to believe that
evidence of crime would be present in the vehicle, and was not predicated
upon any clear-cut finding of exigency.
Chester J. Dombrowski, an off-duty Chicago policeman, was convicted
in a Wisconsin state court of the first-degree murder of Herbert McKinney."' He had been arrested, however, and was under police guard at a
273. 413 U.S. 433, 93 S.Ct. 2523, 37 L.Ed.2d 706 (1973).
274. Justice Rehnquist wrote the majority opinion. He was joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices White, Blackmun and Powell.
275. Justice Brennan wrote the dissenting opinion. He was joined by Justices Douglas,
Stewart and Marshall.
276. 413 U.S. at 434, 93 S.Ct. at 2524, 37 L.Ed.2d at 710-11.
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*hospital; his rented 1967 Thunderbird had already been searched, producing the State's evidence in issue in the case, well before the Wisconsin
police authorities knew or remotely suspected that the murder had occurred. The first contact that the police had with Dombrowski was late on
the evening of September 11, 1969, after he, in an apparently drunken
condition, had driven his Thunderbird through a guard rail and crashed
into a bridge abutment. A passing motorist drove him into the town of
Kewaskum, from which Dombrowski telephoned the police. Two officers
picked him up and drove him back to the scene of the accident. They
noticed his drunken condition as he offered them three conflicting versions
of how the accident occurred . 2 After taking measurements at the accident
scene, the officers took Dombrowski to the police station; after interviewing him there, they took him to a local hospital. There he lapsed into a
coma and was hospitalized overnight. In the meantime, the officers had
had a wrecker tow the Thunderbird to a privately owned garage in Kewaskum, some seven miles from the police station, where it was parked
outside without a police guard.
The-officers had learned from Dombrowski that he was a Chicago policeman. They believed that Chicago police officers were required by departmental regulation to carry a service revolver at all times. The officers did
not find a revolver on Dombrowski's person. Neither did they find one on
the front seat or in the glove compartment of his car before having it towed
away . 8 At approximately 2 a.m. on September 12, 21/2 hours after Dombrowski was arrested for drunken driving, one of the officers went to the
garage and searched the automobile for the revolver which he believed it
must contain. The revolver was not evidence of crime. It would, so the
Wisconsin police thought, have been a violation of the law if Dombrowski
had not had the revolver with him. Justice Rehnquist described the purpose of the police in searching for the missing gun:
The purpose of going to the Thunderbird, as developed on the motion
to suppress, was to look for respondent's service revolver. Weiss testified
that respondent did not have a revolver when he was arrested, and that
the West Bend authorities were under the impression that Chicago police
officers were required to carry their service revolvers at all times. He
stated that the effort to find the revolver was "standard procedure in our
department. ' ' 21
It is readily apparent that Justice Rehnquist did not approach the case
in a traditional Carroll Doctrine mode. There was no evidence of a crime,
let alone probable cause to believe that the Thunderbird contained evidence of crime. In overturning the conviction, the Seventh Circuit had
277.
278.
279.

Id. at 435-36, 93 S.Ct. at 2525, 37 L.Ed.2d at 711.
Id. at 436, 93 S.Ct. at 2525, 37 L.Ed.2d at 711-12.
Id. at 437, 93 S.Ct. at 2526, 37 L.Ed.2d at 712.
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concluded, for no apparent reason, that the "search must therefore have
been for incriminating evidence of other offenses." 25 0 Justice Rehnquist
explicitly repudiated this conclusion and pointed out that the Court of
Appeals "was not free on this record to disregard""'' the findings of fact
made by the state court and the district court which had affirmed the
conviction:
[Bloth the state courts and the District Court found as a fact that the
search of the trunk to retrieve the revolver was "standard procedure in
[that police] department," to protect the public from the possibility that
a rev6lver would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands. Although
the trunk was locked, the car was left outside, in a lot seven miles from
the police station to which respondent had been taken, and no guard was
posted over it."'
The Supreme Court held that the evidence clearly established that "at
the time the search was conducted Officer Weiss was ignorant of the fact
that a murder, or any other crime, had been committed.1113 Self-evidently,
a key element was missing for the invocation of the Carroll Doctrine.
When the police searched the automobile, however, they found in the
trunk blood-soaked garments which ultimately led to the discovery of the
murder and the conviction of Dombrowski. At issue was the warrantless
search which produced these items.
The dissent of Justice Brennan squarely posed the question before the
Court:
In the present case, however, the sole purpose for the initial intrusion into
the vehicle was to search for the gun. Thus, the seizure of the evidence
from the trunk of the car can be sustained under the "plain view" doctrine
only if the search for the gun was itself constitutional. Reliance on the
"plain view" doctrine in this case is therefore misplaced since the antecedent search cannot be sustained.24
There was no doubt that the incriminating evidence was found inadvertently while the police were bent upon another, unrelated mission. There
was no doubt that the evidence was in plain view. There was no doubt that
there was probable cause to believe that the blood-soaked items were evidence of crime. At issue was simply the validity of the prior intrusion into
the trunk. The argument between the majority and the dissent was
280. Id. at 443, 93 S.Ct. at 2529, 37 L.Ed.2d at 716, quoting from Dombrowski v. Cady,
471 F.2d 280, 283.
281. Id. at 443, 93 S.Ct. at 2529, 37 L.Ed.2d at 716. The Wisconsin Supreme Court had
affirmed the conviction at 44 Wis.2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969). The U.S. District Court

denied a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
282. 413 U.S. at 443, 93 S.Ct. at 2529, 37 L.Ed.2d at 715-16.
283.

Id. at 447, 93 S.Ct. at 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d at 718.

284. Id. at 452, 93 S.Ct. at 2533, 37 L.Ed.2d at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting).

19761

AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION

1047

squarely framed in terms of that first element of the Plain View Doctrine-the validity of the prior intrusion.
The majority opinion also recognized the appropriateness of the Plain
View Doctrine as a mode of analysis:
Arguing that the officer's conduct constituted an "inspection" rather
than a "search," petitioner relies on our decision in Harris v. United
States, 390 U.S. 234 . . . (1968), to validate the initial intrusion into the
trunk, and then the plain-view doctrine to justify the warrantless seizure
of the items.
We need not decide this issue. Petitioner conceded in the Court of
Appeals that this intrusion was a search. Inasmuch as we believe that
Harris and other decisions control this case even if the intrusion is characterized as a search, we need not deal with petitioner's belated contention."m
The "belated contention" which did not have to be reached was not the
ultimate warrantless seizure under the Plain View Doctrine but only the
question of whether the prior intrusion antecedent to that seizure would
be treated as a non-searching "inspection" not requiring further analysis
under the fourth amendment or as a "search" the reasonableness of which
would be judged by fourth amendment standards. If the intrusion was
deemed valid by either approach, it would then trigger the Plain View
Doctrine seizure.
The remainder of the Rehnquist opinion looks clearly to the question of
the validity of this non-crime-oriented intrusion. It found it to be reasonable. It looked to the frequent "contact with vehicles for reasons related to
the operation of vehicles themselves"' 1 which state and local police officers, unlike federal officials, have routinely experienced. It stressed the
noncriminal nature of much of this contact:
Because of the extensive regulation of motor vehicles and traffic, and
also because of the frequency with which a vehicle can become disabled
or involved in an accident on public highways, the extent of police-citizen
contact involving automobiles will be substantially greater than policecitizen contact in a home or office. Some such contacts will occur because
the officer may believe the operator has violated a criminal statute, but
many more will not be of that nature. Local police officers, unlike federal
officers, frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim
of criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may
be described as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the
detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation
7
of a criminal statute.
285. Id. at 442, 93 S.Ct. at 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d at 715, note.
286. Id. at 441, 93 S.Ct. at 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d at 714.
287. Id., 93 S.Ct. at 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d at 714-15.
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The message is unmistakable that this reasonable "community caretaking function" may provide the prior valid intrusion giving rise to a Plain
View Doctrine warrantless seizure: "[Ejxtensive and often noncriminal
contact with automobiles will bring local officials in 'plain view' of evidence, fruits, or instrumentalities of a crime, or contraband".'"
In terms of which exception to the warrant requirement was before the
court in Cady v. Dombrowski, the Court gave further light as it approached
its final holding. "We believe that the instant case is controlled by principles that may be extrapolated from Harris v. United States, supra, and
Cooper L. California, supra."89 All the Plain View Doctrine signals were
being sounded.
Assessing the validity of an intrusion made not for purposes of criminal
investigation-even if that intrusion is a search of sorts-one commentator
has distilled the teaching of the case as follows:
The rule of Dombrowski is that warrants are not required for searches
conducted with a benign purpose. This holding is equivalent to the statement that the warrant requirement contained in the second clause of the
fourth amendment applies only to criminal investigations. Considerable
support can be marshalled for this interpretation. Warrants may only be
issued upon probable cause, which has usually been thought to connote a
reasonable suspicion that criminal evidence will be found. In addition, the
justification for a warrant has often been based on the idea that the search
for criminal evidence gives rise to special temptations for offensive activity
by the police. "Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences
[regarding probable cause] be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime."
Dombrowski thus makes the need for a warrant turn on the intent of
the police in conducting the search, and indicates that intent is a question
of fact to be determined in each case.no
The bottom line was that the warrantless intrusion into the trunk of the
Thunderbird, motivated not by a desire to detect or preserve evidence of
crime but by a "concern for the safety of the general public who might be
endangered if an intruder removed a revolver from the trunk of the vehicle," '29 was not unreasonable.
The antecedent prior valid intrusion was thus established for the resulting warrantless seizure of the ultimate evidence found inadvertently in
plain view during the search for the service revolver. This, by definition,
is not the Carroll Doctrine but the Plain View Doctrine.
288. Id. at 442, 93 S.Ct. at 2528, 37 L.Ed.2d at 715.
289. Id. at 444-45, 93 S.Ct. at 2530, 37 L.Ed.2d at 716-17.
290. Note, Warrantless Searches and Seizures of Automobiles, 87 HARV. L. Rv. 835, 85051 (1974), quoting from Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14, 68 S.Ct. 367, 369, 92 L.Ed.
436, 440 (1948).
291. 413 U.S. at 447. 93 S.Ct. at 2531, 37 L.Ed.2d at 718.
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Consent Searches Inside a Vehicle

Strangely, those who insist on expanding the Carroll Doctrine into a
restatement of the entire fourth amendment have resisted the temptation
to take consent searches of automobiles out of general consent law and to
try to cram them too into a grotesquely overblown Carroll Doctrine. Obviously, some warrantless probes into the interior of an automobile may
be analyzed under the consent exception to the warrant requirement rather
than under the CarrollDoctrine.
The "proof of the pudding" is Schneckloth v. Bustamonte.2"1The interior of an automobile, stopped on a highway, was searched by police without a warrant. Recovered from "under the left rear seat ' 2' 3 were three
stolen checks which were used to convict Bustamonte. That the warrantless search was found to have been constitutional is beside the point for
present purposes. What is to the point is that the analysis was exclusively
an analysis under the consent exception to the warrant requirement. The
Carroll Doctrine was not remotely involved.
H. A Vehicle Search Where the Fourth Amendment Is Inapplicable
Cardwell v. Lewis 294 is probably the most doctrinally unsatisfying opin-

ion ever written in the fourth amendment area. It, to be sure, is not the
law of the land. Justice Blackmun wrote for a plurality of four members
of the Court. 95 Justice Powell concurred in the result, but only because of
his belief that federal collateral review should not be available on the
merits of a fourth amendment question. Justice Stewart's dissent" mustered as many votes as Justice Blackmun's plurality opinion mustered. For
whatever persuasive value it may have, however, we will look to the plurality opinion in Cardwell v. Lewis and see where it seems to fit in the fourth
amendment scheme of things.
The prime fault with the plurality opinion is that it failed to appreciate
the difference between a case of the fourth amendment being inapplicable
and a case of the fourth amendment being satisfied. These are the two
overriding threshold questions which should guide us as we approach any
search and seizure problem:
(1) Is the fourth amendment even applicable?
(2) If applicable, has the fourth amendment been complied
with?
Unless and until the first question is answered in the affirmative, we do
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.

412 U.S. 218, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973).
Id. at 220, 93 S.Ct. at 2044, 36 L.Ed.2d at 859
417 U.S. 583, 94 S.Ct. 2464, 41 L.Ed.2d 325 (1974).
The Chief Justice and Justices White and Rehnquist joined in the Blackmun opinion.
Justices Douglas, Brennan and Marshall joined in Justice Stewart's dissent.
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not even go on to the second question. If the fourth amendment is not
applicable, the question of compliance is utterly immaterial.
The plurality opinion in Cardwell v. Lewis seems to lack the courage of
its convictions. Its main thrust is that the fourth amendment is not applicable. It then bootstraps that position, however, by attempting to show
compliance with the fourth amendment. It does not present these two
aspects of its analysis as alternative holdings. It rather tries to add together
two things that do not combine. They are alternative ways of defeating a
defendant's claim of constitutional error. One cannot go five miles down
the route of showing that the fourth amendment did not apply and five
miles down the route of showing that the fourth amendment was satisfied
and add them up to get ten miles of constitutional progress. A little bit of
inapplicability and a little bit of compliance do not add up to a whole lot
of anything.
Arthur Ben Lewis Jr. was convicted in an Ohio state court of the firstdegree murder of Paul Radcliffe. The murder was discovered on the afternoon of July 19, 1967, when Radcliffe's body was found near his car on the
banks of the Olentangy River in Delaware County, Ohio. "The car had
gone over the embankment and had come to rest in brush. Radcliffe had
died from shotgun wounds. Casts were made of tire tracks at the scene and
foreign paint scrapings were removed from the right rear fender of Rad2 97
cliffe's automobile.
A number of circumstances cast suspicion on Lewis. That suspicion had
focused as early as July 24. The police questioned Lewis at his place of
business and observed the model and color of his automobile. They already
suspected that it may have been used to push the Radcliffe vehicle over
the embankment. 2 1 Several months later, in late September, Lewis again
was questioned.
The critical date for constitutional purposes was October 10, 1967. Lewis
was asked to appear at the Office of the Division of Criminal Activities in
Columbus at 10 a.m. on that morning for further interrogation. He had
received the request the night before. As of 8 a.m., a warrant had been
29
obtained for Lewis's arrest. 1
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio 3°° found that "at this
time, in addition to probable cause for the arrest, the police also had
probable cause to believe that Lewis's car was used in the commission of
the crime. ' 30 In addition to the suspicion which focused directly upon
Lewis himself, an automobile similar to his had been observed leaving the
vicinity of the crime. The color of his vehicle was similar to the color of
297.
298.
299.
300.
301.

417 U.S. at 586, 94 S.Ct. at 2467, 41 L.Ed.2d at 332.
Id.
Id., 94 S.Ct. at 2467, 41 L.Ed.2d at 333.
Lewis v. Cardwell, 354 F. Supp. 26 (S.D. Ohio 1972).
417 U.S. at 586-87, 94 S.Ct. at 2467, 41 L.Ed.2d at 333.

19761

AUTOMOBILE EXCEPTION

1051

the foreign paint scrapings taken from the victim's car. It had been established that Lewis had had body repair work done on the grill, hood, right
1
front fender and other parts of his car on the day following the crime.3
Lewis drove to the Office of the Division of Criminal Activities and
parked his car in a public commercial parking lot half a block away.
Although the police were in the possession of the arrest warrant throughout
the day, Lewis was neither served with the warrant nor otherwise arrested
until approximately 5 p.m. Without a warrant, the police towed his automobile from the commercial parking lot to their impounding lot. Its exterior was there examined on the next day. The tread of the right rear tire
matched the cast of a tire impression found at the crime scene. The paint
on Lewis's car matched the foreign paint found on the fender of the victim's car.30 3 At issue was the warrantless examination of Lewis's automobile for paint scrapings and the observation of the tire treads.
The main thrust of the plurality opinion, which is our concern for present
cataloguing purposes, began its analysis by pointing out that there was no
intrusion in this case into any zone of privacy protected by the fourth
amendment:
The evidence with which we are concerned is not the product of a "search"
that implicates traditional considerations of the owner's privacy interest.
It consisted of paint scrapings from the exterior and an observation of the
tread of a tire on an operative wheel. The issue, therefore, is whether the
examination of an automobile's exterior . . . invades a right to privacy
which the interposition of a warrant requirement is meant to protect. 4
This analysis went on to quote Katz v. United States3 1 on the utter lack
of fourth amendment coverage under certain circumstances: "'What a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.' "301
The plurality opinion went on to demonstrate that a citizen had no
constitutional expectation of privacy in the exterior of an automobile:
[I]nsofar as Fourth Amendment protection extends to a motor vehicle,
it is the right to privacy that is the touchstone of our inquiry.
In the present case, nothing from the interior of the car and no personal
effects, which the Fourth Amendment traditionally has been deemed to
protect, were searched or seized and introduced in evidence. With the
"search" limited to the examination of the tire on the wheel and the
taking of paint scrapings from the exterior of the vehicle left in the public
302.
303.
304.
305.
306.
351, 88

Id. at 587, 94 S.Ct. at 2468, 41 L.Ed.2d at 333.
Id. at 587-88, 94 S.Ct. at 2468, 41 L.Ed.2d at 333.
Id. at 588-89, 94 S.Ct. at 2468, 41 L.Ed.2d at 334.
389 U.S. at 351, 88 S.Ct. at 511, 19 L.Ed.2d at 582 (1967).
417 U.S. at 591, 94 S.Ct. at 2469-70, 41 L.Ed.2d at 335, quoting from 389 U.S. at
S.Ct. at 511, 19 L.Ed.2d at 582.
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parking lot, we fail to comprehend what expectation of privacy was infringed."7
The Court then added the "clincher" in terms of making it clear that it
was speaking of fourth amendment inapplicability and not fourth amendment satisfaction: "Stated simply, the invasion of privacy, 'if it can be said
to exist, is abstract and theoretical.' Air Pollution VarianceBoard v. Western Alfalfa Corp.. "0 This is classic "open fields" doctrine "stuff." Air
Pollution Variance Board v. Western Alfalfa Corp."9 was the 1974 decision
which reaffirmed the "open fields" doctrine, first enunciated by Justice
Holmes in Hester v. United States310 in 1924. Hester had pointed out that
"the special protection accorded by the 4th Amendment to the people in
their 'persons, houses, papers, and effects' is not extended to the open
fields. ' 31 The Supreme Court in Air Pollution Variance Board characterized Hester, which it reaffirmed, as having "refused to extend the Fourth
Amendment to sights seen in 'the open fields.' ,312 The unmistakable import of such language is not that the fourth amendment is satisfied but
that the fourth amendment is not even "out there" to be satisfied or
violated.
At that point, the plurality opinion in Cardwell v. Lewis, if it believed
in itself, should have stopped. In terms of the central theme of this article,
this main thrust of the Cardwell v. Lewis plurality opinion illustrates that
some warrantless examinations of automobiles may be catalogued not simply outside the Carroll Doctrine but outside all of the exceptions to the
warrant requirement in the aggregate. Where the fourth amendment is
inapplicable, nothing more need be shown. Where there is no fourth
amendment, there is no warrant requirement and there is therefore no need
to show any exemption from that nonexistent requirement.
The Cardwell opinion did not have the courage of its convictions, however. It went on to demonstrate that there had been probable cause to
believe that Lewis's car contained evidence of the crime. It went on further
to try to demonstrate a strained theory of exigency. The question one
would like to ask, however, is if the fourth amendment was inapplicable,
why bother with such irrelevancies as probable cause and exigency? What
difference would it make if the police had been on a non-exigent "fishing
expedition" out where the fourth amendment doesn't apply? Conversely,
if probable cause and exigency were, indeed, established, why did the
plurality opinion go to such lengths to show the limited scope of the intrusion? If all Carroll Doctrine criteria were satisfied, would not a painstaking
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.

Id. at 591, 94 S.Ct. at 2470, 41 L.Ed.2d at 335.
Id. at 591-92, 94 S.Ct. at 2470, 41 L.Ed.2d at 335-36 (citation omitted).
416 U.S. 861, 94 S.Ct. 2114, 40 L.Ed.2d 607 (1974).
265 U.S. 57, 44 S.Ct. 445, 68 LEd. 898 (1924).
Id. at 59, 44 S.Ct. at 446, 68 L.Ed. at 900.
416 U.S. at 865, 94 S.Ct. at 2116, 40 L.Ed.2d at 611.
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examination of the automobile's interior have been legitimate? In a nutshell, the opinion is far from satisfying.
L

A Bit of Unfinished Business

Although it is beyond the purview of this article to do the exploring, it
may be appropriate to point out for others virgin territories of analysis that
call for further exploration. Has not some of our confusion in dealing with
the Carroll Doctrine been caused by our simple failure to appreciate the
vast conceptual difference between an automobile as a place or container
in which other, smaller items of evidence enjoy a constitutional protection
and an automobile as the very item of evidence itself? Does not an automobile-as an intermediate thing smaller than the average building but larger
than the average chattel-possess a dual character? Must we not make the
distinction between the two characters?
Is an automobile not for some purposes an approximate equivalent of a
house, office, barn or garage-a place, a repository, a container-in which
we and our possessions enjoy a constitutionally safeguarded zone of privacy? Is it not for other purposes, however, the equivalent of a gun, knife
or club-the very weapon sought rather than the place in which the
weapon is sought? Is not an entirely different analysis called for when
dealing with a stolen car and when dealing with a non-stolen car used to
hide a stolen wallet? Is not analysis under the CarrollDoctrine appropriate
for the latter but not for the former?
Where an automobile is used deliberately to run down a pedestrian or
to push a victim's car off a cliff, is it not seizable on sight parked on a
public street or on a public lot under the "open fields" doctrine just as any
other weapon-be it gun, knife or blackjack-would be seizable from the
same "open field"? Is exigency or any other precondition a material consideration when the very object sought is spotted in a constitutionally nonprotected area? When such evidence is seized by the police, is any other
justification required to process the evidence in the crime laboratory? Is
examining an automobile, which has been used as a weapon, for paint
scrapings or indentations or identifying characteristics or victim's fingerprints, blood type, hairs, or textile fibers, any different from examining the
interior of a gun barrel for ballistically significant striations? When the
automobile is the instrumentality itself, is more required to examine its
interior than to examine its exterior? Does not the whole issue of "exterior
versus interior" have significance only if the interior examination is of the
automobile as a container of other evidence and not of the automobile as
the piece of evidence itself?
As we hone our tools of analysis, there are dangers. The notion of "instrumentality" must not be pushed too far. If an automobile used to transport
contraband is deemed to be not a mere repository but the instrumentality
itself in an unlawful transportation case, would not a house used to store
contraband then logically be an instrumentality in an unlawful possession
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case? If an automobile which is the situs of a kidnaping, a murder or a rape
is deemed to be an instrumentality thereof, why logically would not a
garage or office used for the same purposes also be an instrumentality? Do
not both sites provide necessary concealment? If we turn movable "places"
into instrumentalities too heedlessly, may not the precedent come back to
haunt us with respect to fixed "places"? Then again, does a fixed premises
which is itself the probable crime scene enjoy the same fourth amendment
protection as a fixed premises which is merely the safe haven for the
criminal and his incriminating chattels?
Is not the body of our jurisprudence still painfully skimpy in this regard?
Has not our case law and our academic literature alike been derelict? Is
there not a yet unexplored but very real conceptual distinction between an
automobile as the place of search and an automobile as the thing sought?
When we look at the same thing for two different purposes, is not an
undifferentiated analysis a devastating disservice to the state of the art?
Although it appeared to be groping in that direction, the Supreme Court
in CardweU v. Lewis may have missed a golden opportunity to add to the
depth of our fourth amendment jurisprudence. For search and seizure
purposes, was not Lewis's automobile a smoking gun and not a constitutionally protected place? Such may have been intimated but was not unequivocally articulated. The territory is yet to be charted. As we chart, do
we not need to spend less time looking up cases and more time just thinking?
IV.

WHEN THE CARROLL DOCTRINE DOES APPLY:

SOME SEARCHES OF NON-AUTOMOBILES THAT Do INVOLVE

THE "AUTOMOBILE ExcEPTION"

Just as there are many warrantless searches of automobiles that do not
involve the "automobile exception," so too are there many warrantless
searches of non-automobiles that do.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to deal squarely
with this issue, a growing body of case law is recognizing, with no discernible dissent, that the CarrollDoctrine should and does apply to warrantless
searches of suitcases, cartons, boxes and other containers. The conclusion
is irresistible.
We begin with the familiar proposition that "for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses
and cars. ' 313 The simple question then becomes, "Is a suitcase more like a
house or more like a car?" When we weigh the nature of the sanctuary
against the investigative imperative, the conclusion is inevitable that a
suitcase is "more like a car."
What are the relevant considerations as we determine whether probable
313.
(1970).

Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 52, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 1982, 26 L.Ed.2d 419, 429
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cause to believe that a suitcase (or its easily carried equivalents) contains
contraband may ever justify a warrantless search thereof? The two poles
between which we steer have long been fixed. On the one hand, no amount
of probable cause (even in the presence of exigency) will ever justify a
warrantless intrusion into a fixed premises for the purpose of searching for
evidence of crime."' This is the undisputed teaching of Agnello v. United
States,35 Taylor v. United States,316 Johnson v. United States,37 Jones v.
United States,3 and Vale v. Louisiana.3 1 As the Supreme Court said in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire:
Incontrovertible testimony of the senses that an incriminating object is on
premises belonging to a criminal suspect may establish the fullest possible
measure of probable cause. But even where the object is contraband, this
Court has repeatedly stated and enforced the 32basic rule that the police
may not enter and make a warrantless seizure. °
On the other hand, as this article has already fully discussed, it has been
recognized since 1925 that there is
a necessary difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other
structure in respect of which a proper official warrant readily may be
obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or automobile for
contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because
the vehicle can be quickly moved 2out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought. '
The reasoning behind the different treatment was well articulated by
Chambers v. Maroney.321 "Exigent circumstances" justify the warrantless
search of an automobile, where there is probable cause, because the car is
"movable" and because "the car's contents may never be found again if a
warrant must be obtained. ' 32 3 "[Tihe opportunity to search is fleeting
''324

314. In this regard, consideration is not being given to permissible warrantless intrusions
into fixed premises to effect an arrest (with its attendant search incident) or under some other
person-related exigency, as in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 87 S.Ct. 1642, 18 L.Ed.2d
782 (1967), but only to a pure search for evidence qua search for evidence, where the search
for tangible items is the primary purpose of the intrusion and is not a subsidiary incident of
some other purpose.
315. 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145 (1925).

316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

286 U.S. 1, 52 S.Ct. 466, 76 L.Ed. 951 (1932).
333 U.S. 10, 68 S.Ct. 367, 92 L.Ed. 436 (1948).
357 U.S. 493, 78 S.Ct. 1253, 2 L.Ed.2d 1514 (1958).
399 U.S. 30, 90 S.Ct. 1969, 26 L.Ed.2d 409 (1970).
403 U.S. 443, 468, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 2039, 29 L.Ed.2d 564, 584 (citations omitted).
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. at 153, 45 S.Ct. at 285, 69 L.Ed. at 543 (1925).
399 U.S. 42, 90 S.Ct. 1975, 26 L.Ed.2d 419 (1970).

323.

Id. at 51, 90 S.Ct. at 1981, 26 L.Ed.2d at 428.

324. Id.

1056

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Between these two fixed points, where does a suitcase" 5 lie? Even armed
with probable cause and faced with exigent circumstances, what may a
policeman do about a piece of luggage?
The Maryland Court of Special Appeals had no difficulty determining
what a policeman might do:
Although the Carroll Doctrine has frequently been referred to by the
Supreme Court as "the so-called automobile exception," we are persuaded
that its logic is more far-reaching. The reasons of necessity which permit
warrantless searches of automobiles and other vehicles, upon the combination of probable cause and exigent circumstances, apply with equal
force to suitcases and other readily movable containers. This is particularly so when they are consigned to a carrier and are, therefore, literally
in transit, but the logical extension is not limited to situations where a
common carrier is involved. The ultimate justification arises out of the
exigency presented by actual or imminent mobility on a case-by-case
basis.2 '
Throughout the Carrollopinion, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the
historical example of warrantless seizures that were permitted of contraband "goods in the course of transportation."3 It reviewed in detail a
number of early statutes and concluded that
contemporaneously with the adoption of the 4th Amendment, we find in
the first Congress, and in the following second and fourth Congresses, a
difference made as to the necessity for a search warrant between goods
subject to forfeiture, when concealed in a dwelling house or similar place,
and like goods in course of transportation and concealed in a movable
vessel, where they readily could be put out of reach of a search warrant. 38
The language of Preston v. United States indicated that "automobiles"
did not exhaust the category on the less restrictive side of the search and
seizure dichotomy: "Common sense dictates, of course, that questions involving searches of motorcars or other things readily moved cannot be
treated as identical to questions arising out of searches of fixed structures
like houses.

'3

30 intimated that an essential
Cooper v. California'
characteristic of the
more restrictive side of the search and seizure dichotomy was the "fixed"

325. The discussion, though phrased for the sake of convenience in terms of suitcases,
applies with equal validity to cartons, boxes and other readily movable containers. See Note,
CriminalLaw- WarrantlessSearch and Seizure-A Search Warrant It Not Required Where
There Is Probable Cause to Search a Chattel Consigned to a Carrier,5 ST. MARY'S L. J. 187
(1973).
326. Waugh v. State, 20 Md.App. 682, 693, 318 A.2d 204, 211 (1974).
327. 267 U.S. at 149, 45 S.Ct. at 283, 69 L.Ed. at 549.
328. Id. at 151, 45 S.Ct. at 284, 69 L.Ed. at 550.
329. 376 U.S. 364, 366, 84 S.Ct. 881, 883, 11 L.Ed.2d 777, 780 (1964) (emphasis supplied).
330. 386 U.S. 58, 87 S.Ct. 788, 17 L.Ed.2d 730 (1967).
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nature of the property searched, in citing Preston for the proposition that
because cars are "constantly movable" they may be searched with probable cause but without a warrant "although the result might be the opposite
in the search of a home, a store, or other fixed piece of property."33 '
The Supreme Court of California in People v. McKinnon 32 faced the
question of whether the Carroll rationale should "be limited to searches of
automobiles and similar self-propelled 'vehicles' such as trucks, trains,
boats, or airplanes." It concluded that neither "reason nor precedent compels such a narrow, mechanistic reading of Chambers and its predecessors.

' 333

The analysis leading up to its holding is as logically impeccable

as it is eloquent:
Is a box or trunk consigned to a common carrier for shipment to a
remote destination a "thing readily moved" or a "fixed piece of property"?
The answer, self-evidently, is the former. To be sure, such a box has
neither wheels nor motive power; but these features of an automobile are
legally relevant only insofar as they make it movable despite its dimensions. A box, which is a fraction of the size and weight of an automobile,
is movable without such appurtenances. It is also true that a box or trunk,
as distinguished from an automobile, may serve the double purpose of
both storing goods and packaging them for shipment. But whenever such
a box is consigned to a common carrier, there can be no doubt that it is
intended, in fact, to be moved.
What is true of a box or trunk is true of all goods or chattels consigned
to a common carrier for shipment. As they are no less movable than an
automobile, the reasons for the rule permitting a warrantless search of a
vehicle upon probable cause are equally applicable to the search of such
a chattel.
A similar result was reached by the Third Circuit in United States v.
Valen. 35 There two suitcases were searched in Tucson, Arizona, shortly
before their flight east and were found to contain marijuana. The ultimate
seizures were made in the east. The U.S. District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania overturned the conviction on the grounds that the
warrantless search in Tucson was unconstitutional. In reversing that decision and reinstating the conviction, the Third Circuit reasoned that probable cause plus exigent circumstances did justify the warrantless search of
the suitcases in Tucson:
[Tihe government relies on the "exigent circumstances" exception to the
warrant requirement announced in Carroll v. United States . . .and refined in Chambers v. Maroney . . .This exception to the warrant require331.
332.
333.
334.
335.

Id. at 59, 87 S.Ct. at 790, 17 L.Ed.2d at 732 (emphasis supplied).
7 Cal.3d 899, 103 Cal.Rptr. 897, 500 P.2d 1097 (1972).
Id. at __,103 Cal.Rptr. at 903, 500 P.2d at 1103.
Id. at
,103 Cal.Rptr. at 904, 500 P.2d at 1104.
479 F.2d 467 (3rd Cir. 1973).
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ment, authorized for certain automobile searches, is premised on the
theory that the mobility of the automobile presents a danger that contraband will move or disappear. Justice White put it succinctly: "But when
there are exigent circumstances, and probable cause, then the search may
be made without a warrant, reasonably." Chimel v. California . . .
. . .[T]he government emphasizes the extremely high mobility factor
of the suitcases confronting Agent Clements. They were due to leave Tucson by air within the hour. They were destined for Scranton, Pennsylvania, with at least one plane change at New York. . . .Thus, it was
reasonable for him to conclude that a very real possibility existed that the
government could lose the contraband, important evidence of a possible
violation of federal laws. . . .Under the totality of these circumstances,
we hold that there were "exigent circumstances" to make the search with36
out the warrant.1
In its legitimizing as well the warrantless seizure of the suitcases in
Scranton after they had been placed in the trunk of the defendant's automobile, the court made clear that the "exigent circumstances plus probable cause" rationale was not restricted to movables consigned to a common
carrier, a point left in doubt by the California Supreme Court in People v.
McKinnon:
Unlike the BNDD search in Arizona, the Scranton search is distinguishable from Clements' search. First, the suitcases must be viewed as no
longer in the exclusive custody of the government at the time of the
search. Although agents continued to observe the movement of the suitcases, Valen had asserted a possessory interest over them. Second, the
suitcases were removed from the locked trunk of Valen's automobile.. The
opening of the trunk, even though for the singular purpose of obtaining
the suitcases, was a separate search; and we have concluded that this
search is controlled by United States v. Menke ...
. . .The order of the district court suppressing the marijuana evidence
3 37
will be reversed.
The decision of the Second Circuit in United States v. Johnson331 is
interesting, if only because it removes the suitcases, which it held were
legitimately searched without a.warrant, from common carriers specifically and from airline situations generally. Three bank robbers had been
arrested. A "trustworthy" tip established that two suitcases, one of which
contained a shotgun, could be found outside the rear door of a certain
apartment building. The court held:
We find little difficulty in concluding that the officers were justified in
seizing the closed suitcases. It was not practical to secure a warrant be336.
337.
338.

Id. at 470-71 (citations omitted).
Id. at 471-72 (citation omitted).
467 F.2d 630 (2nd Cir. 1972).
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cause the suitcases could have been removed from their position outside
the apartment building at any moment. The suitcases in this situation
were similar to mobile automobiles. See, Carroll v. United States. .. "I
The Ninth Circuit in United States v. Mehciz340 upheld the warrantless
search of a "gray overnight suitcase" taken from the defendant as he
alighted from an interstate flight and searched after he had been handcuffed. The court wobbled a bit in terms of supporting doctrine, posing the
question in terms of a "search incident" (citing Chimel) and then answering the question in terms of "exigency plus probable cause" (citing
Chambers). Notwithstanding the doctrinal fluidity, the answer is instructive:
The Supreme Court has expressly held that "for the purposes of the
Fourth Amendment there is a constitutional difference between houses
and cars.". . . [W]e think it only reasonable to conclude that there is a
corresponding "constitutional difference" between a house and a suit34
case.
The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in Chairesv. State42 upheld the
warrantless search of two suitcases and a footlocker (found to contain
marijuana) after they had been turned over to airline attendants for a
flight from Austin, Texas, to Washington, D.C. The court held:
When the Austin police were informed that the contraband was aboard
an airliner, due to depart in minutes, they had probable cause to inspect
the suspect cargo and, after verifying the agents' suspicions, to seize it and
arrest its owners, before one or all were flown from their jurisdiction.
We are further inclined to conclude that the rationale of the United
States Supreme Court in Chambers v. Maroney . . . should control here.
In dealing with the propriety of an on-the-spot warrantless search of a
moveable vehicle, the court concluded that the requisite "exigent" circumstance for a warrantless search existed where peace officers had sufficient probable cause and the moveable object was "a fleeting target for a
3
search."11

Even as with automobiles, it is important to keep a Carroll Doctrine
339. Id. at 639 (citation omitted).
340. 437 F.2d 145 (9th Cir. 1971).
341. Id. at 147. See also United States v. Maynard, 439 F.2d 1086 (9th Cir. 1971), and
Hernandez v. United States, 353 F.2d 624 (9th Cir. 1965).
342. 480 S.W.2d 196 (Tex.Cr.App. 1972).
343. Id. at 199 (citation omitted). See also Hattersley v. State, 487 S.W.2d 354 (Tex. Cr.
App. 1972); People v. Bleile, 33 Cal.App.3d 203, 108 Cal.Rptr. 682 (1973); and State v. Wolfe,
5 Wash.App. 153, 486 P.2d 1143 (1971). For a fuller discussion of the underlying principles,
see Note, Mobility Reconsidered: Extending the Carroll Doctrine to Movable Items, 58 IOWA
L. REV. 1134 (1973). See also Note, The WarrantlessSearch of a Suitcase Carriedby Arrestee
Is Constitutionally PermissibleEven Though There Is No Danger That the Arrestee Will Get
to the Suitcase to Obtain a Weapon or Destroy Evidence, 9 HOUSTON L. REV. 140 (1971).
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search of a suitcase distinct from any question involving the arrest of its
carrier. It was the importance of this distinction which caused the Maryland Court of Special Appeals in Waugh v. State311 to point out:
Looking forward in point of time from 11:24 p.m., the exigency facing
Corporal Pitt was apparent. A civilian was walking away with the two
suspect suitcases. In this regard, it was immaterial whether the person
walking off with the suitcases was the ultimate arrestee or someone else.
That would be a critical factor only under the "search incident" theory,
not under the "probable cause plus exigency" theory. In terms of exigency,
the threat of removal and subsequent loss would be just as dire whether
the removing agent was the appellant, an airline employee, a taxicab
driver, an innocent relative or friend of the appellant, a confederate for
whom no probable cause existed, an airport thief, or simply an unwitting
stranger who picked up the wrong luggage by mistake. The common de3 45
nominator is that the evidence was disappearing.
V.

CONCLUSION

The Carroll Doctrine applies to non-automobiles as surely as it does to
automobiles and automobile-equivalents. Conversely, there are many warrantless searches of automobiles to which it does not apply.
Analysis under the CarrollDoctrine must be triggered not by that coincidental presence of a motor, four wheels and a drive shaft, but by the
constitutionally significant combination of probable cause to believe that
a movable container (automobile or otherwise) contains evidence of crime
and an exigency arising out of the imminent disappearance of that container (automobile or otherwise). The semantic inertia would be significantly reduced if we could trade in the misleading label of "automobile
exception" for the less linguistically encumbered label of CarrollDoctrine.
And this above all: Keep the analysis clean!
344.
345.

20 Md.App. 682, 318 A.2d 204 (1974).
Id. at 704, 318 A.2d at 216-17.

